Supply chain coordination with controllable lead time and asymmetric information

This paper considers coordinated decisions in a decentralized supply chain consisting of a vendor and a buyer with controllable lead time. We analyze two supply chain inventory models. In the first model we assume the vendor has complete information about the buyer’s cost structure. By taking both the vendor and the buyer’s individual rationalities into consideration, a side payment coordination mechanism is designed to realize supply chain Pareto dominance. In the second model we consider a setting where the buyer possesses private cost information. We design the coordination mechanism by using principal-agent model to induce the buyer to report his true cost structure. The solution procedures are also developed to get the optimal solutions of these two models. The results of numerical examples show that shortening lead time to certain extent can reduce inventory cost and the coordination mechanisms designed for both symmetric and asymmetric information situations are effective.     

A comprehensive extension of an integrated inventory model with ordering cost reduction and permissible delay in payments

Huang (2010) [1] proposed an integrated inventory model with trade credit financing in which the vendor decides its production lot size while the buyer determines its expenditure to minimize the annual integrated total cost for both the vendor and the buyer. In this paper, we extend his integrated supply chain model to reflect the following four facts: (1) generated sales revenue is deposited in an interest-bearing account for the buyer, (2) the buyer’s interest earned is not always less than or equal to its interest charged, (3) the total number of shipments in one lot size is the vendor’s decision variable to minimize the cost, and (4) it is vital to have a discrimination term which can determine whether the buyer’s replenishment cycle time is less than the permissible delay period or not. We then derive the necessary and sufficient conditions to obtain the optimal solution, and establish some theoretical results to characterize the optimal solution. Finally, numerical examples are presented to illustrate the proposed model and its optimal solution.     

Competitive strategies and market segmentation for suppliers with substitutable products

This research studies the competition between two coexisting suppliers in a two-echelon supply chain. The suppliers have different inventory cost structures (holding cost and setup cost). Each supplier offers one type of the two substitutable products to multiple buyers. Buyers’ preferences between the substitutable products differ. Each buyer has a particular order profile (order frequency and quantity). A buyer chooses between the suppliers based on the prices offered by both suppliers and his/her own preference. A Hotelling-type model is used to describe buyers’ preferences for the products. We are able to describe the conditions for buyers to switch between the suppliers, and therefore spot the buyer groups that may or may not switch when the suppliers compete. Pricing strategies for different buyer groups are suggested to the competitive suppliers accordingly. Furthermore, equilibrium prices, market segments, and overall profits for the suppliers are revealed based on Game Theory. An algorithm is also proposed to forecast buyers’ reactions to suppliers’ pricing strategies given the buyers’ order profiles and preferences between the substitutable products.     

Analyzing online B2B exchange markets: Asymmetric cost and incomplete information

This research applies the discriminating auction to analyze the online B2B exchange market in which a single buyer requests multiple items and several suppliers having equal capacity and asymmetric cost submit bids to compete for buyer demand. In the present model, we examine the impact of asymmetric cost and incomplete information on the participants in the market. Given the complete cost information, each supplier randomizes its price and the lower bound of the price range is determined by the highest marginal cost. In addition, the supplier with a lower marginal cost has a larger considered pricing space but ultimately has a smaller equilibrium one than others with higher marginal costs. When each supplier’s marginal cost is private information, the lowest possible price is determined by the number of suppliers and the buyer’s reservation price. Comparing these two market settings, we find whether IT is beneficial to buyers or suppliers depends on the scale of the bid process and the highest marginal cost. When the number of suppliers and the difference between the highest marginal cost and the buyer’s reservation price are sufficiently large, each supplier can gain a higher profit if the marginal costs are private information. On the contrary, when the highest marginal cost approaches the buyer’s reservation price, complete cost information benefits the suppliers.     

Manufacturer cooperation in supplier development under risk

Supplier development involves efforts undertaken by manufacturing firms to improve their suppliers’ capabilities and performance. These improvement efforts can be targeted at a variety of areas such as quality management, product development, and cost reduction. Since supplier development requires investments on the part of the manufacturer, it is important to optimally allocate investment dollars among multiple suppliers to minimize risk while maintaining an acceptable level of return. This paper presents a set of optimization models that address this issue. We consider two scenarios: single-manufacturer and multiple suppliers (SMMS) and two-manufacturer and multiple suppliers (TMMS). In the SMMS case, we suggest optimal investments in various suppliers by effectively considering risk and return. The TMMS case investigates whether manufacturers with differing capabilities could gain risk reduction benefits from cooperating with each other in supplier development. Through illustrative applications, we identify conditions in which both cooperation and non-cooperation are beneficial for manufacturers. Under conditions of cooperation, we propose optimal investments for manufacturers to achieve high levels of risk reduction benefits.     

A dynamic model of supplier switching

While a broad branch of literature deals with the development of buyer–supplier relationships, limited research exists under which circumstances a buyer should terminate such a relationship and switch to a new supplier. Recently, Wagner and Friedl (2007) have developed a framework to analyze a static one-shot supplier switching decision when the buyer has asymmetric information about the supplier’s production costs. We extend their basic framework to a dynamic one, assuming that the supplier learns the production costs over time when he sets up the production process. Since the supplier’s cost information at the individual stages crucially determines the setup and the switching decision, it becomes essential for supply chain management to provide proper incentives so that the supplier reveals his cost information truthfully over time. We characterize the optimal setup and switching strategy as well as the optimal supply chain contract. We also compare our findings with those of the static setting to provide further insights.     

Integrated inventory models considering the two-level trade credit policy and a price-negotiation scheme

This paper develops the integrated inventory models with permissible delay in payment, in which customers’ demand is sensitive to the buyer’s price. The models consider the two-level trade credit policy in the vendor–buyer and buyer–customer relationships in supply chain management. A simple recursive solution procedure is proposed for the integrated models to determine the buyer’s optimal pricing and production/order strategy. Although the total profit from the buyer and vendor increases together, the buyer’s share lessens. To compensate the buyer’s loss due to the cooperative relationship, a negotiation system is presented in order to allocate the profit increase to the vendor and buyer to determine the pricing and production/order strategy. A numerical example and sensitivity analysis are provided to illustrate the proposed model. The results indicate that the total profit from the buyer and vendor together can increase, although a price discount is given to the buyer in the proposed models.     

A scenario-based stochastic model for supplier selection in global context with multiple buyers,currency fluctuation uncertainties,and price discounts

Suppliers network in the global context under price discounts and uncertain fluctuations of currency exchange rates have become critical in today’s world economy. We study the problem of suppliers’ selection in the presence of uncertain fluctuations of currency exchange rates and price discounts. We specifically consider a buyer with multiple sites sourcing a product from heterogeneous suppliers and address both the supplier selection and purchased quantity decision. Suppliers are located worldwide and pricing is offered in suppliers’ local currencies. Exchange rates from the local currencies of suppliers to the standard currency of the buyer are subject to uncertain fluctuations overtime. In addition, suppliers offer discounts as a function of the total quantity bought by the different customer’ sites over the time horizon irrespective of the quantity purchased by each site.     

A procurement model using capacity reservation

In this paper we model a scenario where a buyer reserves capacity from one or more suppliers in the presence of demand uncertainty. We explicitly derive suppliers’ capacity reservation price, which is a function of their capacity, amount of capacity reserved by the buyer and other parameters. The buyer operates in a “built-to-order” environment and needs to decide how much capacity to reserve and from how many suppliers. For a strategy of equal allocation of capacity among the selected suppliers we develop closed form solutions and show that the model is robust to the number of suppliers from whom capacity is procured through reservation. When the parameters of demand distribution changes the supply base is likely to remain more or less the same. Our analysis further shows that increasing the number of pre-qualified suppliers does not provide significant advantages to the buyer. On the other hand, a pre-qualified supply base with greater capacity heterogeneity will benefit the buyer.     

Quality uncertainty and quality-compensation contract for supply chain coordination

Many firms often face quality problems, even though quality improvement has long been a competitive imperative for performance enhancement. When suppliers are the sources of quality problems, prior literature has focused on sustaining a buyer’s competitiveness given the suppliers’ quality uncertainty. Surprisingly, the literature has not paid sufficient attention to quality uncertainty from a coordination perspective. On the other hand, the literature on channel coordination has not considered quality uncertainty in designing a contract of alliance. We bridge the gap between these two streams of literature by explicitly considering quality uncertainty in a coordination framework. In contrast to the coordination literature, we show that channel integration may result in smaller order quantity and less accurate inspection than in a decentralized supply chain if product quality is uncertain. We examine the two most extensively discussed contracts for coordination, buybacks and revenue-sharing, in the presence of quality uncertainty, and find that these two contracts fail to coordinate the supply chain. We then propose a new scheme, the quality-compensation contract, in which the manufacturer compensates the retailer for defective products that are inadvertently sold to consumers, and analytically show that the contract fully coordinates the supply chain.     

First- and second-price sealed-bid auctions applied to push and pull supply contracts

We investigate a newsvendor-type retailer sourcing problem under demand uncertainty who has the option to source from multiple suppliers. The suppliers’ manufacturing costs are private information. A widely used mechanism to find the least costly supplier under asymmetric information is to use a sealed-bid reverse auction. We compare the combinations of different simple auction formats (first- and second-price) and risk sharing supply contracts (push and pull) under full contract compliance, both for risk-neutral and risk-averse retailer and suppliers. We show the superiority of a first-price push auction for a risk-neutral retailer. However, only the pull contracts lead to supply chain coordination. If the retailer is sufficiently risk-averse, the pull is preferred over the push contract. If suppliers are risk-averse, the first-price push auction remains the choice for the retailer. Numerical examples illustrate the allocation of benefits between the retailer and the (winning) supplier for different number of bidders, demand uncertainty, cost uncertainty, and degree of risk-aversion.     

Optimal production and shipment models for a single-vendor–single-buyer integrated system

This paper develops a more general production-inventory model for a single-vendor–single-buyer integrated system. Unlike the hitherto existing production-inventory models for the vendor–buyer system, the present model neither requires the buyer’s unit holding cost greater than the vendor’s nor assumes the structure of shipment policy. Secondly, the model is extended to the situation with shortages permitted, based on shortages being allowed to occur only for the buyer. Thirdly, the paper also presents a corresponding production-inventory model for a deteriorating item for the integrated system. The solution procedures are provided for finding the optimal production and shipment policies and illustrated with numerical examples. Three significant insights are shown: (1) no matter whether the buyer’s unit holding cost is greater than the vendor’s or not, the present model always performs best in reducing the average total cost as compared to the hitherto existing models; (2) if the buyer’s unit holding cost is less than the vendor’s, the optimal shipment policy for the integrated system will only comprise shipments with successive shipment sizes increasing by a fixed factor. It is different from that obtained by Hill [Hill, R.M., 1999. The optimal production and shipment policy for the single-vendor single-buyer integrated production-inventory problem. International Journal of Production Research 37, 2463–2475] for the opposite case; (3) when designing a single-vendor–single-buyer integrated system, making the buyer’s unit holding cost lower than the vendor’s is more beneficial to the system if shortages are not permitted to occur; otherwise it just reverses.     

Bayesian optimal knapsack procurement

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by observable quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. The buyer’s problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. Money does not enter the buyer’s objective function, but only his constraints. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. We report the Bayesian optimal mechanism for the buyer’s problem. We find that simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers are interim optimal.     

A note on supply chain coordination for joint determination of order quantity and reorder point using a credit option

Credit options and side payments are two methods suggested for achieving coordination in a two-echelon supply chain. We examine the credit option coordination mechanism introduced by Chaharsooghi and Heydari [Chaharsooghi, S., & Heydari, J. (2010). Supply chain coordination for the joint determination of order quantity and reorder point using credit option. European Journal of Operational Research, 204(1), 86–95]. This method assumes that the supplier’s opportunity costs are equal to the reduction in the buyer’s financial holding costs during the credit period. In this note, we show that Chaharsooghi and Heydari’s method is not applicable when buyer and supplier opportunity costs are not equal. We introduce an alternate per order rebate method that reduces supply chain costs to centralized management levels.     

Impact of product pricing and timing of investment decisions on supply chain co-opetition

In supply chain co-opetition, firms simultaneously compete and co-operate in order to maximize their profits. We consider the nature of co-opetition between two firms: The product supplier invests in the technology to improve quality, and the purchasing firm (buyer) invests in selling effort to develop the market for the product before uncertainty in demand is resolved. We consider three different decision making structures and discuss the optimal configuration from each firm’s perspective. In case 1, the supplier invests in product quality and sets the wholesale price for the product. The buyer then exerts selling effort to develop the market and following demand potential realization, sets the resale price. In case 2, the supplier invests in product quality followed by the buyer’s investment in selling effort. Then, after demand potential is observed, the supplier sets the wholesale price and the buyer sets the resale price. Finally, in case 3, both firms simultaneously invest in product quality and selling effort, respectively. Subsequently, observing the demand potential, the supplier sets the wholesale price and the buyer sets the resale price. We compare all configuration options from both the perspective of the supplier and the buyer, and show that the level of investment by the firms depends on the nature of competition between them and the level of uncertainty in demand. Our analysis reveals that although configuration 1 results in the highest profits for the integrated channel, there is no clear dominating preference on system configuration from the perspective of both parties. The incentives of the co-opetition partners and the investment levels are mainly governed by the cost structure and the level of uncertainty in demand. We examine and discuss the relation between system parameters and the incentives in desiging the supply contract structure.     

Optimal inventory decisions in a multiperiod newsvendor problem with partially observed Markovian supply capacities

This paper considers a multi-period news-vendor problem with partially observed supply-capacity information which evolves as a Markovian Process. The supply capacity is fully observed by the buyer when the capacity is smaller than the buyer’s ordering quantity. Otherwise, the buyer knows that the current-period supply capacity is greater than its ordering quantity. Based on these two observations, the buyer updates the future supply-capacity forecasting accordingly. With a dynamic programming formulation, we prove the existence of an optimal ordering policy. We also prove that the optimal order quantity is greater than the myopic order quantity.     

Integrated vendor–buyer cooperative inventory models with variant permissible delay in payments

The integrated inventory models usually have the advantage of reducing total cost. However, the way to allocate the cost savings from the integration to the buyer and vendor is critical to the success of the joint relationship between both sides. To deal with this problem, this paper develops the integrated models with the permissible delay in payments for determining the optimal replenishment time interval and replenishment frequency. Applying the models and considering the coefficient of negotiation and the maximum delay payment period, a simple solution algorithm is presented to resolve the allocation of cost savings in the integration model. The coefficient of negotiation is adopted to determine the compromise between the buyer’s and vendor’s cost savings. A numerical example is used to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed integration models. A sensitivity analysis is also conducted to demonstrate some properties. Using the information from the proposed models, the buyer and vendor can achieve an acceptable compromise solution for both sides in the supply chain management.     

供应商掺假行为的博弈分析与机制选择

供应商掺假行为会影响产品最终的质量与安全。本文研究由一个供应商和一个买方组成的分散式供应链,建立以买方为领导者的Stackelberg博弈模型,比较研究延期付款机制、检查机制与溯源机制对供应商掺假行为的影响。研究表明,检查机制与溯源机制无法完全阻止供应商的掺假行为,而延期付款机制可以实现对供应商掺假行为的完全遏制,其中生产掺假产品与非掺假产品的成本差是影响三种机制效率的重要因素。此外,增加买方产品责任成本可以有效降低供应商的掺假意愿,而供应商与买方的融资利率差会增加为防止供应商掺假行为的供应链成本,通过降低检查成本与溯源成本可以促使买方更好地遏制供应商的掺假行为。最后给出算例验证了上述结论,并进一步分析了各机制中不同参数对最优决策和利润的影响。     

Economic order quantity under advance payment

Though advance payment is widely used in practice, its influences on buyer’s inventory policy are rarely discussed. This paper investigates the buyer’s inventory policy under advance payment, including all payment in advance and partial-advanced–partial-delayed payment. The buyer’s ordering policy is derived by minimizing his total inventory costs including inventory holding cost, ordering cost, and interest cost caused by advance payment or delayed payment. The conclusions show that when all the payment is paid in advance, the buyer’s optimal replenishment cycle is influenced only by the price discount associated with advance payment, and the length of advance payment has no effect. For the partial-advanced–partial-delayed payment case, the buyer’s replenishment cycle is also not influenced by the length of advance period. However, in this situation, the delayed period and the price discount may have impacts on the inventory policy. We also use discounted cash flow (DCF) model to derive the buyer’s replenishment cycle and show that the replenishment cycle is negatively related to the length of advance period. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate the results.     

Evaluating and selecting the supplier in detergent production industry using hierarchical fuzzy TOPSIS

Supply chain management has increasingly attracted attention as a systematic approach to integrate the supply chain in order to planning and controlling the materials and information from suppliers to customers. One of the most important issues in supply chain management is selection of the appropriate supplier which has significant effect on purchasing cost decrease and increase in the organization’s competition ability. Selection of the best supplier is naturally complex with no definite structure, and dependent on the type of suppliers’ activity. In the process of decision making about suppliers and many qualitative and quantitative performance indicators such as quality, price, flexibility, and due date should be considered. Then, the supplier selection problem is a multi-criteria decision making problem where numerous methods have been proposed to solve this problem so far. In the current paper, four suppliers of imported raw material “Tripolyphosphate (TPP)” (primary material to produce the detergent powder with a case study in Iran) are evaluated based on 25 effective criteria using the hierarchical fuzzy TOPSIS (HFTOPSIS) approach.