Recent developments in dynamic advertising research

A variety of continuous-time differential functions have been developed to investigate dynamic advertising problems in business and economics fields. Since major dynamic models appearing before 1995 have been reviewed by a few survey papers, we provide a comprehensive review of the dynamic advertising models published after 1995, which are classified into six categories: (i) Nerlove–Arrow model and its extensions, (ii) Vidale–Wolfe model and its extensions, (iii) Lanchester model and its extensions, (iv) the diffusion models, (v) dynamic advertising-competition models with other attributes, and (vi) empirical studies for dynamic advertising problems. For each category, we first briefly summarize major relevant before-1995 models, and then discuss major after-1995 models in details. We find that the dynamic models reviewed in this paper have been extensively used to analyze various advertising problems in the monopoly, duopoly, oligopoly, and supply chain systems. Our review reveals that the diffusion models have not been used to analyze advertising problems in supply chain operations, which may be a research direction in the future. Moreover, we learn from our review that very few publications regarding dynamic advertising problems have considered the supply chain competition. We also find that very few researchers have used the diffusion model to investigate the dynamic advertising problems with product quality as a decision variable; and, the pricing decision has not been incorporated into any extant Lanchester model. The paper ends with a summary of our review and suggestions on possible research directions in the future.     

Advertising strategies in a franchise system

The main question of this research is: Who should undertake promotional and brand-image advertising if the franchisor and franchisees act so as to maximize their respective profits? To address this question, we study a two-stage advertising game between a franchisor and two adjacent franchisees. In the first stage of the game, the franchisor chooses between three advertising models – centralizing or delegating the two types of advertising to the franchisees or delegating only promotional advertising. In the second stage, given the franchisor’s choice of an advertising model, the two franchisees decide whether or not to cooperate. Our main findings are that (1) the franchisees should cooperate if the franchisor delegates either both brand-image and promotional advertising or promotional advertising, although cooperation between franchisees does not necessary improve the franchisor’s profits. (2) The choice of an advertising arrangement critically depends on the margins as well as the costs of performing both promotional and brand-image advertising. We also discuss the conditions under which the three advertising models should be implemented.     

Coordinating advertising and pricing in a manufacturer–retailer channel

Cooperative advertising is a practice that a manufacturer pays retailers a portion of the local advertising cost in order to induce sales. Cooperative advertising plays a significant role in marketing programs of channel members. Nevertheless, most studies to date on cooperative advertising have assumed that the market demand is only influenced by advertising expenditures but not by retail price. This paper addresses channel coordination by seeking optimal cooperative advertising strategies and equilibrium pricing in a two-member distribution channel. We establish and compare two models: a non-cooperative, leader–follower game and a cooperative game. We develop propositions and insights from the comparison of these models. The cooperative model achieves better coordination by generating higher channel-wide profits than the non-cooperative model with these features: (a) the retailer price is lower to consumers; and (b) the advertising efforts are higher for all channel members. We identify the feasible solutions to a bargaining problem where the channel members can determine how to divide the extra profits.     

不同决策模式下的双渠道供应链合作广告博弈分析

本文研究了双渠道供应链中非合作广告模式、合作广告模式和战略联盟模式下的合作广告问题,给出了不同决策模式下的均衡解。对比分析发现:战略联盟模式中品牌广告和零售商广告投入水平最高,网络广告投入水平最低且零售渠道的产品需求最高。合作广告模式和战略联盟模式中的系统收益与广告比率负相关,与产品网络适应度正相关。     

A network equilibrium framework for Internet advertising: Models,qualitative analysis,and algorithms

In this paper, we develop a network equilibrium framework for the modeling and analysis of competitive firms engaged in Internet advertising among multiple websites. The model allows for the determination of both the equilibrium online advertising budget as well as the advertising expenditures on the different websites. We then specialize the model to the case of fixed online budgets for the firms. The governing equilibrium conditions of both models are shown to satisfy finite-dimensional variational inequalities. We present qualitative properties of the solution patterns as well as computational procedures that exploit the underlying abstract network structure of these problems. The models and algorithms are illustrated with numerical examples. This paper adds to the growing literature of the application of network-based techniques derived from operations research to the advertising/marketing arena.     

Advertising Response Functions and Media Planning

In the first part of this paper the definition and use of advertising response functions are examined critically. It is shown that advertising response functions cannot be regarded as models of the advertising process whose parameters are known, that only a small section of the complex functions often postulated is relevant to media planning, that measures of advertising impacts or exposures are relative rather than absolute, and consequently that the “response function” only shows a notional relationship between advertising response and exposure, which normally needs to be calibrated to the advertising appropriation.In the second part a media planning system which utilizes a “control parameter” rather than a “response function” is described. The main feature of the “control parameter” is that it adapts itself so that an appropriate relationship between response and exposure is used, whatever the appropriation. Other features of the system are described.     

Cooperative advertising models in supply chain management: A review

This paper reviews articles on cooperative advertising, a topic which has gained substantial interest in the recent years. Thereby, we first briefly distinguish five different definitions of cooperative advertising which can be found in operations research literature. After that, we concentrate on vertical cooperative advertising, which is the most common object of investigation and is understood as a financial agreement where a manufacturer offers to pay a certain share of his retailer’s advertising expenditures. In total, we identified 58 scientific papers considering mathematical modeling of vertical cooperative advertising. These articles are then analyzed with regard to their general model setting (e.g., the underlying supply chain structure and design of the cooperative advertising program). After that, we explain the different demand and cost functions that are employed, whereupon we distinguish between static and dynamic models. The last dimension of our review is dedicated to the game-theoretic concepts which are mostly used to reflect different forms of distribution of power within the channel.     

Channel Coordination with Cooperative Advertising Considering Effect of Advertising on Willingness to Pay

In this paper, cooperative advertising in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain is studied. Advertising can enhance willingness to pay (WTP) of customers. This trade-off between the benefits of increasing WTP of customers and the advertising expenditure is a key to understanding the retailers optimal advertising decision. On the other hand, it is interesting to understand in which condition supporting the retailer for his advertising expenditure is beneficial for the manufacturer. In this study, in order to capture pricing and advertising strategies of the channel member, three non-cooperative games including Nash, Stackelberg retailer and Stackelberg manufacturer game-theoretic models are established. In spite of the related studies which restrict price in order to prevent negative demand, the proposed model allows channel members to increase their prices by enhancing WTP of customers. In this study, contrary to similar additive form demand functions applied in the co-op ad literature which limits their studies for cases that profit function is concave with respect to variables, optimal prices and advertising strategies are obtained for all the solution space. Surprisingly for the very high values of the advertising effect coefficient, a finite optimal advertising expenditure is achieved.     

Using several advertising media in a homogeneous market

We propose a variety of models to represent the joint effect of several advertising media on the demand for a product in a homogeneous market, and discuss the associated profit maximization problems. An advertising productivity function represents the combination of several media and, together with demand and advertising cost functions, determines the features of the associated profit problem. We distinguish between additive and nonadditive advertising productivity functions, then between smooth and nonsmooth ones. The demand function may either be linear or not. We observe how different models may exhibit either synergy or interference effects. In some cases we obtain explicit optimal solutions.     

Co-op advertising models in manufacturer–retailer supply chains: A game theory approach

In the literature of cooperative (co-op) advertising, the focus of research is on a relationship in which a manufacturer is the leader and retailers are followers. This relationship implies the dominance of the manufacturer over retailers. Recent market structure reviews have shown a shift of retailing power from manufacturers to retailers. Retailers have equal or even greater power than a manufacturer when it comes to retailing. Based on this new market phenomenon, we intend to explore the role of vertical co-op advertising efficiency with respect to transactions between a manufacturer and a retailer through brand name investments, local advertising expenditures, and sharing rules of advertising expenses. Three co-op advertising models are discussed which are based on two noncooperative games and one cooperative game. In a leader–follower noncooperative game, the manufacturer is assumed to be a leader who first specifies the brand name investment and the co-op subsidization policy. The retailer, as a follower, then decides on the local advertising level. In a noncooperative simultaneous move game, the manufacturer and the retailer are assumed to act simultaneously and independently. In a cooperative game, the system profit is maximized for every Pareto efficient co-op advertising scheme, but not for any other schemes. All Pareto efficient co-op advertising schemes are associated with a single local advertising level and a single brand name investment level, but with variable sharing policies of advertising expenses. The best Pareto efficient advertising scheme is obtained taking members' risk attitudes into account. Utilizing the Nash bargaining model, we discuss two situations that (a) both members are risk averse, and (b) both members are risk neutral. Our results are consistent with the bargaining literature.     

制造商与渠道势力不对称零售商的合作广告模型研究

研究制造商与渠道势力不对称零售商的合作广告问题.在需求不确定的情况下,建立了制造商和零售商的分散式与集中式系统下的合作广告模型,得到了不同系统下制造商和强势零售商的最优合作广告策略、强势零售商和边缘零售商的最优订货策略,及他们的最优期望利润.通过对不同系统下均衡结果的比较分析,证明了分散式系统存在不协调.设计了实现渠道协调的联合契约,指出分散式协调系统下的联合契约不唯一,契约参数两两正相关,广告补贴率、产品批发价格和回购价格是制造商和强势零售商力量平衡的焦点.     

Modelling Cooperative Advertising Decisions in Franchising

Advertising fee decisions in franchise systems are a frequent source of conflict between franchisors and franchisees. Such disagreements persist because the win-win potential of vertical cooperative advertising is not well appreciated. Our paper introduces a formal normative approach for analyzing, understanding and subsequently making these vertical cooperative advertising decisions within a franchising context in a manner that results in optimal system-wide returns. The model demonstrates that cooperative determination of franchisor's and franchisee's advertising contributions may yield superior payoffs for both exchange partners than the total payoff if the franchisor and franchisee seek to optimize their individual objective functions. Three types of models are developed and evaluated (i.e. deterministic, stochastic and under conditions of differing perceptions of the sales response functions to advertising). Conclusions hold under all three model variants. Industry implications are also presented.     

Stochastic diffusion models with advertising and word-of-mouth effects

This paper presents a stochastic diffusion model which incorporates advertising word-of-mouth effects. The model defines a 3 variate stochastic process based on explicit assumptions regarding consumer behavior and consumers' response to advertising. The model generalizes a wide variety of advertising models and in addition includes several classes of consumers, interaction effects between these consumers and, of course, a stochastic framework that may be used for assessing the risk implications of advertising policies and for empirical analyses purposes.     

Alternative statistical regression studies of the effects of Joint and Service Specific advertising on military recruitment

Three different regression approaches use a large database developed by the Wharton Center for Applied Research (WCAR) to study the effects of Joint versus Service Specific advertising on military recruitment. (Here ‘Joint’ refers to advertising designed to serve recruitment for all four services simultaneously. Service Specific refers to advertising administered separately by each of the four services.) These regression approaches and the data and models are examined with special reference to US Army recruitment. The WCAR study led to a recommendation to replace Service Specific with Joint advertising. This recommendation was called into question by the RAND Corporation in its study that used a different regression approach. A third study that combines regressions with data envelopment analysis (DEA) is presented in this paper. This study utilizes recently developed methods based on DEA which, when incorporated in the regression, make it possible to distinguish between efficient and inefficient performances. The resulting regression yields results that show Joint advertising to be not only less efficient but also to attract potential recruits from the Army to other services. Implications for further research are set forth, which can also cast light on commercial practice by regarding Joint as a type of ‘category advertising’ and Service Specific as a type of ‘brand advertising’.     

带有随机产出和广告投入的Newsboy模型

首次将随机产出和广告投入同时引入到Newsboy模型中,分别在乘积形式随机产出和加和形式随机产出情况下,建立带有广告费用的最优决策模型,通过分析得出如下结论:在乘积随机产出情况下,随着广告费用的不断增加,最优计划生产量在快速增加;而在加和形式随机产出情况下,随着广告费用不断增加时,最优计划生产量也在不断增加,但其增加的速率较小。最后,指出乘积形式的随机产出适用于刚上市的新产品,而加和形式的随机产出适用于品牌产品。     

关键词广告支付模式的研究

关键词广告是主要用于搜索引擎的一种广告销售机制.所谓关键词既指搜索用户在搜索框内输入的检索词,也指机器程序从用户浏览的网页内容中抓取的词.广告主的广告依据关键词触发而展现在相应网页上.对搜索引擎来说,选择广告的支付模式是销售机制的核心命题.在互联网发展的实践中出现了许多支付模式,比如按展现付费(Pay-Per-Impression),接点击付费(Pay-Per-Click),按呼叫付费(Pay-Per-Call)和按销量付费(Pay-Per-Sale)等.如果实现这些支付模式的条件都具备,那么哪一种付费方式对搜索引擎是最有利的?试图回答这个问题.主要结论是对搜索引擎来讲,按点击付费是最优或近似最优的支付模式.     

A game theoretic approach to coordinate pricing and vertical co-op advertising in manufacturer-retailer supply chains

Vertical cooperative (co-op) advertising is a marketing strategy in which the retailer runs local advertising and the manufacturer pays for a portion of its entire costs. This paper considers vertical co-op advertising along with pricing decisions in a supply chain; this consists of one manufacturer and one retailer where demand is influenced by both price and advertisement. Four game-theoretic models are established in order to study the effect of supply chain power balance on the optimal decisions of supply chain members. Comparisons and insights are developed. These embrace three non-cooperative games including Nash, Stackelberg-manufacturer and Stackelberg-retailer, and one cooperative game. In the latter case, both the manufacturer and the retailer reach the highest profit level; subsequently, the feasibility of bargaining game is discussed in a bid to determine a scheme to share the extra joint profit.     

Advertising for a new product introduction: A stochastic approach

We formulate a stochastic extension of the Nerlove and Arrow’s advertising model in order to analyze the problem of a new product introduction. The main idea is to introduce some uncertainty aspects in connection both with the advertising action and the goodwill decay, in order to represent the random consequences of the advertising messages and of the word-of-mouth publicity, respectively. The model is stated in terms of the stochastic optimal control theory and a general study is attempted using the stochastic Maximum Principle. Closed form solutions are obtained under linear quadratic assumptions for the cost and the reward functions. Such optimal policies suggest that the decision-maker considers both the above mentioned phenomena as opportunities to increase her/his final reward. After stating some general features of the optimal solutions, we analyze in detail three extreme cases, namely the deterministic model and the stochastic models with either the word-of-mouth effect only, or the lure/repulsion effect only. The optimal policies provide us with some insight on the general effects of the advertising action. Supported by MIUR and University of Padua.     

Optimum advertising policy over time for subscriber service innovations in the presence of service cost learning and customers’ disadoption

On the theoretical side, this paper characterizes qualitatively optimal advertising policy for new subscriber services. A monopolistic market is analyzed first for which customers’ disadoption, discounting of future profits streams and a service cost learning curve are allowed. After characterizing the optimal policy for a general diffusion model, the results pertaining to a specific diffusion model for which advertising affects the coefficient of innovation that incorporates the disadoption rate are reported. The results of the theoretical research show that the advertising policy of the service firm in the presence of customers’ disadoption could be very different from the same when disadoption is ignored.On the empirical side, four alternative diffusion models are estimated and their predictive powers using a one-step-ahead forecasting procedure compared. The diffusion data analyzed are related to the Canadian cable TV industry. Empirical research findings suggest that the specific diffusion model considered above is not only of theoretical appeal but also of major empirical relevance.The analytical findings of the study are documented in six theoretical propositions for which proofs are provided in a separate Appendix. The results of a related numerical experiment together with the analytical findings pertaining to the competitive role of advertising are included. Managerial implications of the study together with directions for future research are also discussed.     

广告媒介下互补产品市场扩散扰动模型研究

创新产品通过广告媒介来传递信息以提高市场需求,对产品的扩散起着一定的作用.将创新产品的互补性分为三类互补类型,即两种产品均有独立的市场,两个产品均无独立市场,只有一个产品有独立市场.分别建立广告媒介下具有互补关系的创新产品扩散动态模型,分析具有不同竞争力的创新产品具有互补关系时市场的稳定状态,解释了产品互补型的企业纵向兼并及合用的原因,为模拟和预测动态市场结构演变及管理决策提供了理论依据.