基于商业信用和回购契约的供应链最优化策略研究

本文考虑由单一供应商和零售商组成的供应链系统,当供应商为零售商提供回购契约,同时零售商又为下游顾客提供商业信用契约时,供应商如何设计回购契约来有效协调整个供应链,以及零售商又如何借助回购和商业信用契约来做出自身最优订货策略问题,并建立了相应的决策模型。通过模型分析,给出了供应商和零售商在四种情形下的最优契约设计参数,以及零售商的最优订货决策。研究发现,当满足一定的参数范围时,供应链中两主体同时采用协调契约能够更加有效地增加整个供应链中的订货量和利润,为各主体创造更多新的价值。最后,本文结合数值例子,分析了模型参数变化对最优订货策略和各主体利润的影响。     

提前期需求为模糊随机条件下的连续库存补货策略

考虑提前期内需求为模糊随机变量且提前期为可缩短情形下,建立由购买商和供应商所组成的简单供应链连续库存补货策略优化模型,其中订单量、再订货点和提前期为决策变量.首先推导出模糊随机需求条件下购买商和供应链的成本函数,然后,进一步考虑总需求为三角模糊数,推导出供应商、购买商和供应链的模糊成本函数.在此基础上分别从购买商成本最小和供应链成本最小角度对模型进行求解,结合具体算例对模型进行应用分析和比较分析,结果表明模型具有有效性和实用性,并得出如下结论:从购买商本身角度考虑订购策略所产生的供应链成本总是大于从供应链整体角度考虑订货策略所产生的供应链成本,同时从购买商本身角度考虑订货策略所产生的最优订购量、购买商成本低于从供应链整体角度考虑订货策略所产生的最优订购量、购买商成本.     

供应链买卖双方协调订货模型

供需关系贯穿供应链的整个过程;然而,如何促使非一体化供应链协调问题在实践中是非常重要的.因此,供需双方订货批量的研究是供应链管理的一个重要内容之一.本文以订单方式为背景,针对供应链环境下单个供应商和多个订货商在非合作情况下的订货模型进行讨论,并在此基础上给出了一个改进后的线性价格折扣策略,该策略同时考虑了增量折扣和减量折扣两种情况,同时给出了供需上双方订货的S tackelberg博弈模型.数字实验结果表明该折扣模型对于改善供应链运作协调是相当有效的.     

随机需求下的价格折扣策略研究

供需关系贯穿供应链的整个过程。因此，供需双方订货批量研究是供应链管理的一个最重要也最基本的内容之一。本以订单方式为背景，讨论了供应链环境下一个供应商和一个订货商在非合作情况下的订货模型，并在此基础上引进了一个价格折扣策略，该策略同时考虑了增量折扣和减量折扣两个情况，并给出了供需双方订货的Stackelberg博弈模型和考虑完全合作的Pareto优化模型。最后以算例加以说明。     

基于时变需求的集成多级供应链生产订货策略研究

考虑一个时变需求环境下集成多级供应链问题,在有限的规划时间内销售商以固定周期订货,而生产商以不同的周期生产,目的是寻找销售商最优的订货周期和生产商最佳的生产策略,从而使供应链系统的总运营成本最少.建立了该问题的混合整数非线性规划模型,求解该模型分为两步：先求对应一个订货周期的最佳生产策略,再求最优的订货周期,第一步用到了图论里求最短路方法.给出了两个步骤的算法和程序,实验证明它们是有效的.通过算例对模型进行了分析,研究了各参数对最优解及最小费用的影响.     

需求信息泄露条件下供应链零售商订货策略研究

针对供应链订货过程中的需求信息泄露现象,通过对比供应商在泄露信息和不泄露信息情况下的收益,研究了供应链需求信息泄露的产生机理。建立了需求信息泄露条件下订货过程中零售商之间的信号博弈模型,通过模型求解得到了分离均衡和混同均衡的存在条件,并对不同均衡状态下零售商的最优订货策略和最优收益进行了分析。在此基础上,进一步讨论了零售商的订货策略选择问题。最后,通过一个数值算例说明了有关结论的有效性。     

资金成本下延迟支付期限的收益分享契约

针对由单一制造商和单一零售商组成的供应链系统,建立了随机需求下考虑有资金成本延迟支付期限的收益分享契约模型,研究两种决策(分散化和集中化)下,延迟支付期限是如何影响资金约束零售商的最优订货数量以及供应链系统的利润.分析表明,不管是分散化还是集中化决策,考虑有资金成本延迟支付期限的收益分享契约使供应链系统的最优订货量和利润都增大.最后,运用数值分析验证了结论.     

供应商免费送货条件下零售商的订货策略选择研究

电子商务交易中越来越多的供应商采用免费送货策略.以由供应商训零售商组成的两阶段供应链为对象,分别从从量免费送货和从价免费送货两种角度用数值分析方法讨论零售商的订货策略选择,得出零售商在面对供应商免费送货条件时会采取的订货策略.研究结果对零售商制定订货策略具有实际帮助.     

期权对冲下零售商最优订货策略及供应链协调机制

考虑到市场需求与金融衍生品标的资产之间的关联性,在供应链契约中同时引入看涨期权和看跌期权.首先,在线性相关条件下,得到了基于期权对冲的零售商最优订货策略,结果表明零售商能够利用期权对冲策略获得最大期望收益.其次,进一步基于看涨看跌期权定价理论探索了供应链协调机制,剖析了看涨看跌期权对供应链整体收益的作用,发现利用期权对冲策略可获得供应链最大期望利润.最后,用数值算例分析p,c,m,S₀,r,T,σ对利润及最优订货策略的影响.     

订货批量对牛鞭效应的影响分析

对于一个采用连续检查(s,S)订货策略的两级供应链,本文运用Markov链理论,通过对正则平稳Markov链行为特征的分析发现,即使不考虑需求预测方法,供货短缺,提前期和价格波动等因素,仅仅零售商的订货批量就能够产生牛鞭效应.研究结果表明,在需求分布和订货批量的变化范围满足一些条件时,减小订货批量有助于减弱牛鞭效应,从而提高供应链的运作效率.     

Single versus multiple supplier sourcing strategies

Successful supply chain management necessitates an effective sourcing strategy to combat uncertainties in both supply and demand. In particular, supply disruption results in excessive downtime of production resources, upstream and downstream supply chain repercussions, and eventually a loss in the market value of the firm. In this paper we analyze single period, single product sourcing decisions under demand uncertainty. Our approach integrates product prices, supplier costs, supplier capacities, historical supplier reliabilities and firm specific inventory costs. A unique feature of our approach is the integration of a firm specific supplier diversification function. We also extend our analysis to examine the impact of minimum supplier order quantities. Our results indicate that single sourcing is a dominant strategy only when supplier capacities are large relative to the product demand and when the firm does not obtain diversification benefits. In other cases, we find that multiple sourcing is an optimal sourcing strategy. We also characterize a non-intuitive trade-off between supplier minimum order quantities, costs, and supplier reliabilities. Finally, we examine the robustness of our results through an extensive numerical analysis of the key parameters of our model.     

随机需求下有产能约束的技术创新策略研究

在随机需求和技术变革的环境下,基于有产能约束的单供应商-单零售商的供应链结构,研究供应商分销价格决策和技术创新策略以及零售商订货决策。建立了三阶段Stackelberg博弈模型,通过逆推方法求得了供应商最优分销价格和技术创新策略以及零售商最优订货量,深入探讨了供应商产能、新技术出现概率以及市场需求期望与波动分别对供应商、零售商和供应链整体利润的影响。结果表明当供应商产能不足时进行技术创新会提高供应商和供应链的利润,但零售商因间接承担供应商技术创新的投资成本而利润下降;当供应商产能过剩时进行技术创新则会降低供应商及供应链的利润,而零售商的利润增加。新技术出现概率增加会提高供应链各成员的利润;提高市场需求期望并减小市场波动对供应商及供应链有利,但可能会降低零售商的利润。     

销售商出售看跌期权的供应链优化研究

在由一个供应商和一个销售商组成的单期两级供应链中,处于主导地位的销售商以其卖场所具有的销售能力参与供应链合作,并从销售的每一个产品中获取既定收益。同时,销售商还向供应商出售建立在产品销售量保障基础上的看跌期权,以激励供应商参与供应链合作。论文对上述情形的销售商出售看跌期权的供应链合作问题进行了研究,通过建模与优化分析,证明了在销售商提供看跌期权的供应链合作中,供应商存在唯一的最优生产批量和看跌期权采购量,以及销售商存在最优的从每一单位产品销售中获取的既定收益。论文还揭示了销售商提供看跌期权,虽然无法实现供应链协调,但可以实现供应链参与企业所获得的收益与其所承担的风险相匹配。最后,论文论证了在销售商出售看跌期权机制下,供应链存在收益损失较小的理想合作区域。     

基于实物期权的双源供应链柔性采购协调策略

在需求不确定下,由风险规避的供应商和占主导地位的零售商组成的二级供应链中,构建了在现货市场影响下基于实物期权的双源柔性采购协调模型,给出了实现供应链协调的最优期权参数的求解算法,探讨了现货市场价格不确定性和供应商风险规避特性对零售商采购策略和双方利润的影响。研究结果表明,在考虑现货市场影响和供应商风险规避的条件下,实物期权契约可以实现供应链协调。     

Coordinating a three-echelon supply chain under price and quality dependent demand with sub-supply chain and RFM strategies

The paper considers a three-echelon supply chain which consists of one supplier, one manufacturer and one retailer for trading a single product. The market demand at the retailer is influenced by the retail price and the quality of the product. The quality of the finished product at the manufacturer depends on the supplier’s raw material quality. We analyze the model for both deterministic and stochastic demand patterns. We first study the centralized and decentralized systems, and then the decentralized system with a sub-supply chain coordination strategy (where the manufacturer chooses to merge with either the supplier or the retailer and then acts as a single entity) and the two-level retail fixed mark-up (RFM) strategy. In the case of the two-level RFM strategy, the manufacturer and the retailer use fixed mark ups over the supplier’s wholesale price. The proposed models are demonstrated through numerical examples. It is observed from the numerical study that the two-level RFM strategy is superior to the sub-supply chain coordination strategy. Further, the two-level RFM strategy in the stochastic demand scenario is not as effective as in the deterministic demand scenario.     

Price fluctuations,information sharing,and supply chain performance

We consider a supply chain consisting of one supplier with finite production capacity and a retailer facing independent and identically distributed demands from end-customers. Existing research advocates that, in a decentralized setting, the retailer and the supplier using stationary order up to policies is efficient. We show that in the presence of information sharing, the supply chain performance can be improved by the supplier offering fluctuating prices. We study two specific settings: (1) the supplier only knows the parameters of the retailer’s inventory policy; and (2) the supplier knows the day-to-day inventory levels at the retailer as well. After establishing structure of optimal policies and developing efficient solution procedures, we perform an extensive computational study to determine the extent of the improvements realizable in the supply chain. We observed that for setting 1, an improvement was realized only when the end-customer demands were highly variable. Even then, the improvement in supply chain performance was less than 1%. Whereas, for setting 2, the improvement in supply chain performance averaged around 5.0% with a maximum of 16.3%.     

Strategic wholesale pricing in a supply chain with a potential entrant

This paper develops an adverse selection model for a two-stage supply chain with one supplier, one retailer, and a potential outside entrant supplier who makes a partially substitutable product. The work is different from most research on entry deterrence that only considers a single-stage model. Our main interest is to investigate how the incumbent supplier can strategically maximize her profit by a wholesale pricing policy when facing the potential entrant. We focus on a model where the entrant supplier will sell her product through the same incumbent retailer. We derive the optimal decisions for each player and study the comparative statics of the equilibrium. To investigate how the supply chain structure may affect the deterrence strategy of the incumbent supplier, we also consider three alternative models with different channel structures, when both suppliers sell their products directly, when the entrant has another independent retailer, and when the entrant sells her product directly. Through the comparison, we find that the existence of the common downstream retailer often enhances the deterring motivation of the incumbent supplier.     

A dynamic model of supplier switching

While a broad branch of literature deals with the development of buyer–supplier relationships, limited research exists under which circumstances a buyer should terminate such a relationship and switch to a new supplier. Recently, Wagner and Friedl (2007) have developed a framework to analyze a static one-shot supplier switching decision when the buyer has asymmetric information about the supplier’s production costs. We extend their basic framework to a dynamic one, assuming that the supplier learns the production costs over time when he sets up the production process. Since the supplier’s cost information at the individual stages crucially determines the setup and the switching decision, it becomes essential for supply chain management to provide proper incentives so that the supplier reveals his cost information truthfully over time. We characterize the optimal setup and switching strategy as well as the optimal supply chain contract. We also compare our findings with those of the static setting to provide further insights.     

需求与库存水平相关的供应链量折扣协调模型

考虑由一个供应商和一个零售商构成的供应链系统,零售商的市场需求依赖于该产品的库存水平,研究了利用批量折扣实现供应链完美协调的问题.首先,我们得出了在分散式系统下供应链无法实现完美协调,讨论了供需双方的最优决策.其次,作为stackelberg的主导方,供应商提供批量折扣计划,得出了此折扣计划实现系统完美协调的条件,分别给出了实现完美协调和不能实现完美协调时的批量折扣计划.最后分析了需求函数中的参数和产品的成本对实现供应链系统完美协调的影响.