Constructive Axiomatizations of Plane Absolute,Euclidean and Hyperbolic Geometry

In this paper we provide quantifier‐free, constructive axiomatizations for 2‐dimensional absolute, Euclidean, and hyperbolic geometry. The main novelty consists in the first‐order languages in which the axiom systems are formulated.     

Axiomatizations of Euclidean geometry in terms of points,equilateral triangles or squares, and incidence

Dimension-free Euclidean geometry over Euclidean ordered fields can be axiomatized in a two-sortedfirst-order language, with points and regular n-gons (with n = 3 or 4) as variables, and with a binary predicate standing for the incidence of a point and a regular n-gon as the only primitive notions.     

Stability of compromise solution in multicriteria decision-making problems

Stability is a desirable attribute of the nondominated solution in the decision-making problem with multiple noncommensurable objectives. It is assumed that the decision space is given by a system of inequalitiesG(x)≤b, b ∈ R ^N . In this paper, sufficient conditions are determined for a compromise solution to be stable with respect to the changes ofb.     

Axiomatizations of team logics

In a modular approach, we lift Hilbert-style proof systems for propositional, modal and first-order logic to generalized systems for their respective team-based extensions. We obtain sound and complete axiomatizations for the dependence-free fragment FO(～) of Väänänen's first-order team logic TL, for propositional team logic PTL, quantified propositional team logic QPTL, modal team logic MTL, and for the corresponding logics of dependence, independence, inclusion and exclusion.As a crucial step in the completeness proof, we show that the above logics admit, in a particular sense, a semantics-preserving elimination of modalities and quantifiers from formulas.     

Using metaheuristic compromise programming for the solution of multiple-objective scheduling problems

In this paper, we propose a generic approach to find compromise solutions for multiple-objective scheduling problems using metaheuristics. As an illustration, we present a new hybrid tabu search/variable neighbourhood search application of this approach for the solution of a bi-objective scheduling problem. Through numerical experiments we demonstrate its efficiency and effectiveness. We have confirmed that compromise programming with the tabu-VNS metaheuristic generates solutions that approach those of the known reference sets.     

Data envelopment analysis with common weights: the compromise solution approach

A characteristic of data envelopment analysis (DEA) is to allow individual decision-making units (DMUs) to select the factor weights that are the most advantageous for them in calculating their efficiency scores. This flexibility in selecting the weights, on the other hand, deters the comparison among DMUs on a common base. In order to rank all the DMUs on the same scale, this paper proposes a compromise solution approach for generating common weights under the DEA framework. The efficiency scores calculated from the standard DEA model are regarded as the ideal solution for the DMUs to achieve. A common set of weights which produces the vector of efficiency scores for the DMUs closest to the ideal solution is sought. Based on the generalized measure of distance, a family of efficiency scores called ‘compromise solutions’ can be derived. The compromise solutions have the properties of unique solution and Pareto optimality not enjoyed by the solutions derived from the existing methods of common weights. An example of forest management illustrates that the compromise solution approach is able to generate a common set of weights, which not only differentiates efficient DMUs but also detects abnormal efficiency scores on a common base.     

Axiomatizations of symmetrically weighted solutions

If the excesses of the coalitions in a transferable utility game are weighted, then we show that the arising weighted modifications of the well-known (pre)nucleolus and (pre)kernel satisfy the equal treatment property if and only if the weight system is symmetric in the sense that the weight of a subcoalition of a grand coalition may only depend on the grand coalition and the size of the subcoalition. Hence, the symmetrically weighted versions of the (pre)nucleolus and the (pre)kernel are symmetric, i.e., invariant under symmetries of a game. They may, however, violate anonymity, i.e., they may depend on the names of the players. E.g., a symmetrically weighted nucleolus may assign the classical nucleolus to one game and the per capita nucleolus to another game.     

Application of fuzzy compromise solution method for fit concept selection

The modern manufacturing environment is highly turbulent so as to satisfy the dynamic needs of customers’. To enable the achievement of competitiveness in this complex business environment, newer manufacturing strategies have been introduced for enabling waste elimination and enhancing flexibility and responsiveness of systems. Fit manufacturing is a competitive manufacturing paradigm which includes lean and agile systems coupled with sustainable benefits. This article presents a study in which the concept selection in fit environment was formulated as Multi Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) problem and solved using fuzzy based compromise solution method, Vlsekriterijumska Optimizacija I Kompromisno Resenje (VIKOR). The selected concept design of automotive component was subjected to implementation in the case organisation.     

A compromise solution for the multiobjective stochastic linear programming under partial uncertainty

This paper solves the multiobjective stochastic linear program with partially known probability. We address the case where the probability distribution is defined by crisp inequalities. We propose a chance constrained approach and a compromise programming approach to transform the multiobjective stochastic linear program with linear partial information on probability distribution into its equivalent uniobjective problem. The resulting program is then solved using the modified L-shaped method. We illustrate our results by an example.     

Iterated egalitarian compromise solution to bargaining problems and midpoint domination

We introduce a new solution for two-person bargaining problems: the iterated egalitarian compromise solution. It is defined by using two prominent bargaining solutions, the egalitarian solution (Kalai, 1977) and the equal-loss solution (Chun, 1988), in an iterative fashion. While neither of these two solutions satisfy midpoint domination – an appealing normative property – we show that the iterated egalitarian compromise solution does so.     

模糊合作对策核心的公理化

本文主要研究模糊合作对策的核心,讨论了核心的限制非空性,个体合理性,递归对策性,逆递归对策,超可加性,反单调性,模性等性质.最后用限制非空性,个体合理性,递归对策性和超可加性等公理刻画了核心,证明了核心存在的唯一性。     

Optimal compromise solution of multi-objective minimal cost flow problems in fuzzy environment

Ghatee and Hashemi [M. Ghatee, S.M. Hashemi, Ranking function-based solutions of fully fuzzified minimal cost flow problem, Inform. Sci. 177 (2007) 4271–4294] transformed the fuzzy linear programming formulation of fully fuzzy minimal cost flow (FFMCF) problems into crisp linear programming formulation and used it to find the fuzzy optimal solution of balanced FFMCF problems. In this paper, it is pointed out that the method for transforming the fuzzy linear programming formulation into crisp linear programming formulation, used by Ghatee and Hashemi, is not appropriate and a new method is proposed to find the fuzzy optimal solution of multi-objective FFMCF problems. The proposed method can also be used to find the fuzzy optimal solution of single-objective FFMCF problems. To show the application of proposed method in real life problems an existing real life FFMCF problem is solved.     

Axiomatizations of the Shapley value for games on augmenting systems

This paper deals with cooperative games in which only certain coalitions are allowed to form. There have been previous models developed to confront the problem of unallowable coalitions. Games restricted by a communication graph were introduced by Myerson and Owen. In their model, the feasible coalitions are those that induce connected subgraphs. Another type of model is introduced in Gilles, Owen and van den Brink. In their model, the possibilities of coalition formation are determined by the positions of the players in a so-called permission structure. Faigle proposed another model for cooperative games defined on lattice structures. We introduce a combinatorial structure called augmenting system which is a generalization of the antimatroid structure and the system of connected subgraphs of a graph. In this framework, the Shapley value of games on augmenting systems is introduced and two axiomatizations of this value are showed.     

Axiomatizations of the core on the universal domain and other natural domains

We prove that the core on the set of all transferable utility games with players contained in a universe of at least five members can be axiomatized by the zero inessential game property, covariance under strategic equivalence, anonymity, boundedness, the weak reduced game property, the converse reduced game property, and the reconfirmation property. These properties also characterize the core on certain subsets of games, e.g., on the set of totally balanced games, on the set of balanced games, and on the set of superadditive games. Suitable extensions of these properties yield an axiomatization of the core on sets of nontransferable utility games. Received September 1999/Final version December 2000     

Axiomatizations of Lovász extensions of pseudo-Boolean functions

Three important properties in aggregation theory are investigated, namely horizontal min-additivity, horizontal max-additivity, and comonotonic additivity, which are defined by certain relaxations of the Cauchy functional equation in several variables. We show that these properties are equivalent and we completely describe the functions characterized by them. By adding some regularity conditions, these functions coincide with the Lovász extensions vanishing at the origin, which subsume the discrete Choquet integrals. We also propose a simultaneous generalization of horizontal min-additivity and horizontal max-additivity, called horizontal median-additivity, and we describe the corresponding function class. Additional conditions then reduce this class to that of symmetric Lovász extensions, which includes the discrete symmetric Choquet integrals.     

收益模糊合作对策Shapley值的公理化

研究一类收益模糊的合作对策,这类对策联盟的模糊收益值可以用一个闭区间的形式来表示,本文定义了一个拓展的闭区间空间和一些闭区间线性运算算子,证明了这类对策的Shapley值可以用承载性、可替代性和可加性进行了公理化.     

欧氏空间中紧致超曲面的欧氏直径的一点注记

本文对欧氏空间中分别具有给定截面曲率和Ｒｉｃｃｉ曲率的紧致超曲面的欧氏直径做了估计