Intertemporal service pricing with strategic customers

We study a two-period intertemporal pricing game in a single-server service system with forward-looking strategic customers who make their purchase decision based on current information and anticipated future gains. Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) prices are derived. A comparison between revenue-maximizing equilibrium prices and welfare-maximizing equilibrium prices is conducted and the impact on the system’s performance of misunderstanding customers’ type is evaluated.     

Supply chain network equilibrium with strategic financial hedging using futures

In this paper, we develop a network equilibrium model for supply chain networks with strategic financial hedging. We consider multiple competing firms that purchase multiple materials and parts to manufacture their products. The supply chain firms’ procurement activities are exposed to commodity price risk and exchange rate risk. The firms can use futures contracts to hedge the risks. Our research studies the equilibrium of the entire network where each firm optimizes its own operation and hedging decisions. We use variational inequality theory to formulate the equilibrium model, and provide qualitative properties. We provide analytical results for a special case with duopolistic competition, and use simulations to study an oligopolistic case. The analytical and simulation studies reveals interesting managerial insights.     

A supply chain network equilibrium model with random demands

In this paper, we develop a supply chain network model consisting of manufacturers and retailers in which the demands associated with the retail outlets are random. We model the optimizing behavior of the various decision-makers, derive the equilibrium conditions, and establish the finite-dimensional variational inequality formulation. We provide qualitative properties of the equilibrium pattern in terms of existence and uniqueness results and also establish conditions under which the proposed computational procedure is guaranteed to converge. Finally, we illustrate the model through several numerical examples for which the equilibrium prices and product shipments are computed. This is the first supply chain network equilibrium model with random demands for which modeling, qualitative analysis, and computational results have been obtained.     

Supply chain networks,electronic commerce,and supply side and demand side risk

In this paper, we develop a supply chain network model in which both physical and electronic transactions are allowed and in which supply side risk as well as demand side risk are included in the formulation. The model consists of three tiers of decision-makers: the manufacturers, the distributors, and the retailers, with the demands associated with the retail outlets being random. We model the optimizing behavior of the various decision-makers, with the manufacturers and the distributors being multicriteria decision-makers and concerned with both profit maximization and risk minimization. We derive the equilibrium conditions and establish the finite-dimensional variational inequality formulation. We provide qualitative properties of the equilibrium pattern in terms of existence and uniqueness results and also establish conditions under which the proposed computational procedure is guaranteed to converge. We illustrate the supply chain network model through several numerical examples for which the equilibrium prices and product shipments are computed. This is the first multitiered supply chain network equilibrium model with electronic commerce and with supply side and demand side risk for which modeling, qualitative analysis, and computational results have been obtained.     

A supply chain model with direct and retail channels

We study a dual channel supply chain in which a manufacturer sells to a retailer as well as to consumers directly. Consumers choose the purchase channel based on price and service qualities. The manufacturer decides the price of the direct channel and the retailer decides both price and order quantity. We develop conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer share the market in equilibrium. We show that the difference in marginal costs of the two channels plays an important role in determining the existence of dual channels in equilibrium. We also show that demand variability has a major influence on the equilibrium prices and on the manufacturer’s motivation for opening a direct channel. In the case that the manufacturer and the retailer coordinate and follow a centralized decision maker, we show that adding a direct channel will increase the overall profit. Our numerical results show that an increase in retailer’s service quality may increase the manufacturer’s profit in dual channel and a larger range of consumer service sensitivity may benefit both parties in the dual channel. Our results suggest that the manufacturer is likely to be better off in the dual channel than in the single channel when the retailer’s marginal cost is high and the wholesale price, consumer valuation and the demand variability are low.     

Revenue management for a supply chain with two streams of customers

In this paper, we consider revenue management for a service supply chain with one supplier and one retailer. The supplier has a limited capacity of a perishable product and both the supplier and the retailer face customers. Each customer may choose to buy a product from either the supplier or the retailer by considering prices and the cost associated with switching. For the centralized model, the supplier determines the selling prices for both herself and the retailer, and the retailer simply collects a commission fee for each product sold. We derive monotone properties for the revenue functions and pricing strategies. Further, we show that the commission fee increases the retailer’s price while decreasing the supplier’s and leads to efficiency loss of the chain. For the decentralized decision-making model, the supplier and the retailer compete in price over time. Two models are considered. In the first, the retailer buys products from the supplier before the selling season and in the second the retailer shares products with the supplier in retailing. For both models, we discuss the existence of the equilibrium and characterize the optimal decisions. Numerical results are presented to illustrate properties of the models and to compare the supply chain performance between the centralized and the decentralized models.     

Formation of a strategic manufacturing and distribution network with transfer prices

We propose a profit maximization model for the decision support system of a firm that wishes to establish or rationalize a multinational manufacturing and distribution network to produce and deliver finished goods from sources to consumers. The model simultaneously evaluates all traditional location factors in a manufacturing and distribution network design problem and sets intra-firm transfer prices that take account of tax and exchange rate differentials between countries. Utilizing the generalized Benders decomposition approach, we exploit the partition between the product flow and the cash allocation (i.e., the pricing and revenue assignment) decisions in the supply chain to find near optimal model solutions. Our proposed profit maximizing strategic planning model produces intuitive results. We offer computational experiments to illustrate the potential valuable guidance the model can provide to a firm's supply chain design strategic planning process.     

Resale price maintenance in supply chains with general multiplicative demand

We analyze a supply chain with a Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) contract in which the manufacturer sets the retail price with a general multiplicative price–demand function and prove the existence/uniqueness of an equilibrium. We also compare the equilibrium prices and quantities, consumer surplus and total system welfare for the RPM and wholesale price contracts. We conclude that a manufacturer may capture a smaller share of the total supply chain profit despite her ability to set the retail price.     

Dynamics of supply chain networks with corporate social responsibility through integrated environmental decision-making

In this paper, we develop a dynamic framework for the modeling and analysis of supply chain networks with corporate social responsibility through integrated environmental decision-making. Through a multilevel supply chain network, we model the multicriteria decision-making behavior of the various decision-makers (manufacturers, retailers, and consumers), which includes the maximization of profit, the minimization of emission (waste), and the minimization of risk. We explore the dynamic evolution of the product flows, the associated product prices, as well as the levels of social responsibility activities on the network until an equilibrium pattern is achieved. We provide some qualitative properties of the dynamic trajectories, under suitable assumptions, and propose a discrete-time algorithm which is then applied to track the evolution of the levels of social responsibility activities, product flows and prices over time. We illustrate the model and computational procedure with several numerical examples.     

Supply chain coordination by manufacturer reward contract

We investigate how a manufacturer sets a reward contract to realize supply chain coordination when a retailer's service effort has a showrooming effect. We demonstrate that the manufacturer's reward contract increases retail prices and benefits the retailer but may hurt the manufacturer. Meanwhile, a large unit reward can soften the price competition. We also find that when the unit reward is high, a greater showrooming effect may benefit supply chain members, and the retailer provides a higher service effort.     

Pricing in a supply chain for auction bidding under information asymmetry

We examine a supply chain in which a manufacturer participates in a sealed-bid lowest price procurement auction through a distributor. This form of supply chain is common when a manufacturer is active in an overseas market without establishing a local subsidiary. To gain a strategic advantage in the division of profit, the manufacturer and distributor may intentionally conceal information about the underlying cost distribution of the competition. In this environment of information asymmetry, we determine the equilibrium mark-up, the ex-ante expected mark-up and expected profit of the manufacturer and the equilibrium bid of the distributor. In unilateral communication, we demonstrate the informed agent’s advantage resulting to higher mark-up. Under information sharing, we show that profit is equally shared among the supply chain partners and we explicitly derive the mark-up when the underlying cost distribution is uniform in [0, 1]. The model and findings are illustrated by a numerical example.     

Decentralization versus coordination in competing supply chains under retailers’ extended warranties

This paper studies a two-tier duopoly competing supply chain system consisting of two manufacturers and two exclusive retailers. Both manufacturers produce differentiated products and both retailers provide extended warranties for the products they sell. Two types of channel-structure strategy options are considered: a decentralized structure with a wholesale price contract and a coordinated structure with a sophisticated contract. We first derive the equilibrium outcomes under three possible chain-to-chain competition scenarios. Subsequently, we reveal how manufacturers control their retail channels to gain more supply chain system profit under an interactive environment with supply chain competition and retailers’ extended warranties. We find that pure coordinated channel competition and pure decentralized channel competition may both reach equilibrium. Furthermore, the interaction forces of supply chain competition and extended warranty service significantly impact the characteristics of the equilibria. Finally, we analyze the competing supply chain’s coordination contract design by using the example of a two-part tariff contract, and determine the feasible contract parameter range that results in a win-win solution for supply chain members.

     

Modeling and analysis of the multiperiod effects of social relationship on supply chain networks

In this paper, we analyze the effects of levels of social relationship on a multiperiod supply chain network with multiple decision-makers (suppliers, manufacturers, and retailers) associated at different tiers. The model incorporates the individual attitudes towards disruption and opportunism risks and allows us to investigate the interplay of the heterogeneous decision-makers and to compute the resultant network equilibrium pattern of production, transactions, prices, and levels of social relationship over the multiperiod planning horizon. In our analysis, we focus on the following questions: (1) how do the evolving relationships affect the profitability and risks of supply chain firms as well as the prices and demands of the product in the market? (2) how do the relationships with the upstream supply chain firms affect the relationships with the downstream firms, and how these relationships influence the profitability and risks of the supply chain firms? (3) how do the supply disruption risks interact with the opportunism risks through supply chain relationships, and how these risks influence the profitability of the firms? The results show that high levels of relationship can lead to lower supply chain overall cost, lower risk, lower prices, higher product transaction and therefore higher profit.     

基于再制造的多周期闭环供应链网络均衡模型

针对单周期模型在刻画废旧产品回收和再制造过程中的局限性,以多周期的再制造闭环供应链网络为研究对象,利用均衡理论和变分不等式的方法构建了基于再制造的多周期闭环供应链网络均衡模型,得到了制造商和零售商及整个供应链网络的均衡条件及其经济解释,并分析了均衡解的唯一性条件。针对所建立的模型,利用Euler算法进行了算例分析,说明了潜在市场份额对供应链成员决策的影响。     

The impact of power structure on the retail service supply chain with an O2O mixed channel

While the Internet has provided a new means for retailers to reach consumers, it has fundamentally changed the dynamic of competition in the retail service supply chain. The mix of offline and online channels adds a new dimension of competition, and one central issue of this competition is the pricing strategy between the two channels. How to set prices for both online and offline channels? What is the impact of the supply chain power structure on pricing decisions and the performance? This research aims to address these questions by focusing on a retail service supply chain with an online-to-offline (O2O) mixed dual-channel. From the Supplier-Stackelberg, Retailer-Stackelberg, and Nash game theoretical perspectives, we obtain the optimal prices and maximum profits for both the retailer and supplier under different power structures. The analysis result provides important managerial implications, which will be beneficial to retailers to develop proper pricing strategies.     

Optimal pricing strategies under co-existence of price-takers and bargainers in a supply chain

We investigate how the co-existence of two types of customers, price-takers, and bargainers, influences the pricing decisions in a supply chain. We consider a stylized supply chain that includes one manufacturer and one retailer, and we characterize the optimal prices of the retailer and the manufacturer. We further discuss the effects of the fraction of the bargainers in the customer population and the relative bargaining power of the bargainers on these optimal prices. Our results show that, given the wholesale price, the lowest price at which the retailer is willing to sell (ie, cut-off price) increases with the relative bargaining power of the bargainers. Both posted and cut-off prices increase in the fraction of the bargainers in the customer population. Moreover, depending on the type of negotiation cost, the variations of both prices will vary. In equilibrium, both posted and cut-off prices do not monotonically increase with the fraction of the bargainers in the customer population. When the maximum reservation price of the customers is low, and/or the negotiation costs are high, and/or the relationship between the bargainer's negotiation cost and reservation price is high, the retailer may reduce both posted and cut-off prices as the fraction of the bargainers increases.     

Bundling decisions in supply chains

Firms often sell products in bundles to extract consumer surplus. While most bundling decisions studied in the literature are geared to integrated firms, we examine a decentralized supply chain where the suppliers retain decision rights. Using a generic distribution of customers’ reservation price we establish equilibrium solutions for three different bundling scenarios in a supply chain, and generate interesting insights for distributions with specific forms. We find that (i) in supply chain bundling the retailer’s margin equals the margin of each independent supplier, and it equals the combined margin when the suppliers are in a coalition, (ii) when the suppliers form a coalition to bundle their products the bundling gain in the supply chain is higher and retail price is lower than when the retailer bundles the products, (iii) the supply chain has more to gain from bundling relative to an integrated firm, (iv) the first-best supply chain bundling remains viable over a larger set of parameter values than those in the case of the integrated firm, (v) supplier led bundling is preferable to separate sales over a wider range of parameter values than if the retailer led the bundling, and (vi) if the reservation prices are uniformly distributed bundling can be profitable when the variable costs are low and valuations of the products are not significantly different from one another. For normally distributed reservation prices, we show that the bundling set is larger and the bundling gain is higher than that for a uniform distribution.     

Multitiered Supply Chain Networks: Multicriteria Decision—Making Under Uncertainty

In this paper, we present a supply chain network model with multiple tiers of decision-makers, consisting, respectively, of manufacturers, distributors, and retailers, who can compete within a tier but may cooperate between tiers. We consider multicriteria decision-making for both the manufacturers and the distributors whereas the retailers are subject to decision-making under uncertainty since the demands associated with the product are random. We derive the optimality conditions for the decision-makers, establish the equilibrium conditions, and derive the variational inequality formulation. We then utilize the variational inequality formulation to provide both qualitative properties of the equilibrium product shipment, service level, and price pattern and to propose a computational procedure, along with convergence results. This is the first supply chain network model to capture both multicriteria decision-making and decision-making under uncertainty in an integrated equilibrium framework.     

带有环境指示因子的闭环供应链网络均衡的互补模型研究

以非线性互补理论为基本工具,提出带有环境指示因子且由原料供应商、制造商、零售商、需求市场及回收中心组成的闭环供应链网络均衡。鉴于对可持续发展的日益关注,环境保护部门通过实施对制造商的排放进行惩罚的机制以遏制其污染行为,同时通过对回收中心的回收实行奖励的机制以激励其回收行为。排放惩罚与回收奖励应大于相应的影子价格,这些影子价格作为环境指示因子由模型决定且有益于政府部门制定相应环保政策。在描述不同决策者优化行为的基础上推导最优性条件,得到对应于闭环供应链网络均衡问题的非线性互补模型,证明解的存在性进而构造数值算例以验证模型的合理性。