N-person differential games governed by semilinear stochastic evolution systems

In this paper the problem ofN-person infinite-dimensional stochastic differential games governed by semilinear stochastic evolution control systems is discussed. First the minimax principle which is the necessary condition for the existence of open-loop Nash equilibrium is proved. Then the necessary and sufficient conditions of open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibrium for linear quadratic infinite-dimensional stochastic differential games are derived.     

Forward and Backward Mean-Field Stochastic Partial Differential Equation and Optimal Control

This paper is mainly concerned with the solutions to both forward and backward mean-field stochastic partial differential equation and the corresponding optimal control problem for mean-field stochastic partial differential equation. The authors first prove the continuous dependence theorems of forward and backward mean-field stochastic partial differential equations and show the existence and uniqueness of solutions to them. Then they establish necessary and sufficient optimality conditions of the control problem in the form of Pontryagin''s maximum principles. To illustrate the theoretical results, the authors apply stochastic maximum principles to study the infinite-dimensional linear-quadratic control problem of mean-field type. Further, an application to a Cauchy problem for a controlled stochastic linear PDE of mean-field type is studied.     

余模范畴中的余倾斜预包络和余倾斜挠类

众所周知, Assem-Smal定理在倾斜理论中有重要的作用.本文的目的是建立一个在余模范畴中的Assem-Smal定理的版本,并通过利用预包络理论来刻画余模范畴中的余倾斜挠类.     

Nash Equilibria of Risk-Sensitive Nonlinear Stochastic Differential Games

This paper considers a class of risk-sensitive stochastic nonzero-sum differential games with parametrized nonlinear dynamics and parametrized cost functions. The parametrization is such that, if all or some of the parameters are set equal to some nominal values, then the differential game either becomes equivalent to a risk-sensitive stochastic control (RSSC) problem or decouples into several independent RSSC problems, which in turn are equivalent to a class of stochastic zero-sum differential games. This framework allows us to study the sensitivity of the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the original stochastic game to changes in the values of these parameters, and to relate the NE (generally difficult to compute and to establish existence and uniqueness, at least directly) to solutions of RSSC problems, which are relatively easier to obtain. It also allows us to quantify the sensitivity of solutions to RSSC problems (and thereby nonlinear H-control problems) to unmodeled subsystem dynamics controlled by multiple players.     

Stabilization of Passive Nonlinear Stochastic Differential Systems by Bounded Feedback

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to give a systematic method for global asymptotic stabilization in probability of nonlinear control stochastic differential systems the unforced dynamics of which are Lyapunov stable in probability. The approach developed in this paper is based on the concept of passivity for nonaffine stochastic differential systems together with the theory of Lyapunov stability in probability for stochastic differential equations. In particular, we prove that, as in the case of affine in the control stochastic differential systems, a nonlinear stochastic differential system is asymptotically stabilizable in probability provided its unforced dynamics are Lyapunov stable in probability and some rank conditions involving the affine part of the system coefficients are satisfied. Furthermore, for such systems, we show how a stabilizing smooth state feedback law can be designed explicitly. As an application of our analysis, we construct a dynamic state feedback compensator for a class of nonaffine stochastic differential systems.     

A Type of General Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equations and Applications

The authors discuss one type of general forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) with It?o’s stochastic delayed equations as the forward equations and anticipated backward stochastic differential equations as the backward equations. The existence and uniqueness results of the general FBSDEs are obtained. In the framework of the general FBSDEs in this paper, the explicit form of the optimal control for linearquadratic stochastic optimal control problem with delay and the Nash equilibrium point for nonzero sum differential games problem with delay are obtained.     

Singular mean-field control games

This article studies singular mean field control problems and singular mean field two-players stochastic differential games. Both sufficient and necessary conditions for the optimal controls and for the Nash equilibrium are obtained. Under some assumptions the optimality conditions for singular mean-field control are reduced to a reflected Skorohod problem, whose solution is proved to exist uniquely. Motivations are given as optimal harvesting of stochastic mean-field systems, optimal irreversible investments under uncertainty and mean-field singular investment games. In particular, a simple singular mean-field investment game is studied, where the Nash equilibrium exists but is not unique.     

Nash and Stackelberg Differential Games

A large class of stochastic differential games for several players is considered in this paper.The class includes Nash differential games as well as Stackelberg differential games.A mix is possible.The...     

REGULARITY THEORY FOR SYSTEMS OF PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS WITHN EUMANN BOUNDARY CONDITIONS

Inroductlonu consider here a system     

A BSDE approach to Nash equilibrium payoffs for stochastic differential games with nonlinear cost functionals

In this paper, we study Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games via the theory of backward stochastic differential equations. We obtain an existence theorem and a characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with nonlinear cost functionals defined with the help of doubly controlled backward stochastic differential equations. Our results extend former ones by Buckdahn et al. (2004) [3] and are based on a backward stochastic differential equation approach.     

Denumerable state stochastic games with limiting average payoff

We study stochastic games with countable state space, compact action spaces, and limiting average payoff. ForN-person games, the existence of an equilibrium in stationary strategies is established under a certain Liapunov stability condition. For two-person zero-sum games, the existence of a value and optimal strategies for both players are established under the same stability condition.The authors wish to thank Prof. T. Parthasarathy for pointing out an error in an earlier version of this paper. M. K. Ghosh wishes to thank Prof. A. Arapostathis and Prof. S. I. Marcus for their hospitality and support.     

Stochastic differential games: Occupation measure based approach

A new approach based on occupation measures is introduced for studying stochastic differential games. For two-person zero-sum games, the existence of values and optimal strategies for both players is established for various payoff criteria. ForN-person games, the existence of equilibria in Markov strategies is established for various cases.     

Time dependent critical fluctuations of a one dimensional local mean field model

Summary One-dimensional stochastic Ising systems with a local mean field interaction (Kac potential) are investigated. It is shown that near the critical temperature of the equilibrium (Gibbs) distribution the time dependent process admits a scaling limit given by a nonlinear stochastic PDE. The initial conditions of this approximation theorem are then verified for equilibrium states when the temperature goes to its critical value in a suitable way. Earlier results of Bertini-Presutti-Rüdiger-Saada are improved, the proof is based on an energy inequality obtained by coupling the Glauber dynamics to its voter type, linear approximation.     

Forward–backward stochastic differential equations with monotone functionals and mean field games with common noise

We consider a system of forward–backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) with monotone functionals. We show that such a system is well-posed by the method of continuation similarly to Peng and Wu (1999) for classical FBSDEs. As applications, we prove the well-posedness result for a mean field FBSDE with conditional law and show the existence of a decoupling function. Lastly, we show that mean field games with common noise are uniquely solvable under a linear-convex setting and weak-monotone cost functions and prove that the optimal control is in a feedback form depending only on the current state and conditional law.     

随机脉冲随机微分方程解的存在唯一性

提出了随机脉冲随机微分方程模型,其中所谓的随机脉冲是指脉冲幅度由随机变量序列驱动,并且脉冲发生的时间也是一个随机变量序列.因此,随机脉冲随机微分方程是对带跳的随机微分方程模型的推广.利用Gronwall不等式、Lipschtiz条件和随机分析技巧,得到了随机脉冲随机微分方程的解的存在唯一性条件.     

Linear–quadratic stochastic two-person nonzero-sum differential games: Open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria

In this paper, we consider a linear–quadratic stochastic two-person nonzero-sum differential game. Open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria are introduced. The existence of the former is characterized by the solvability of a system of forward–backward stochastic differential equations, and that of the latter is characterized by the solvability of a system of coupled symmetric Riccati differential equations. Sometimes, open-loop Nash equilibria admit a closed-loop representation, via the solution to a system of non-symmetric Riccati equations, which could be different from the outcome of the closed-loop Nash equilibria in general. However, it is found that for the case of zero-sum differential games, the Riccati equation system for the closed-loop representation of an open-loop saddle point coincides with that for the closed-loop saddle point, which leads to the conclusion that the closed-loop representation of an open-loop saddle point is the outcome of the corresponding closed-loop saddle point as long as both exist. In particular, for linear–quadratic optimal control problem, the closed-loop representation of an open-loop optimal control coincides with the outcome of the corresponding closed-loop optimal strategy, provided both exist.     

带随机跳跃的线性二次非零和微分对策问题

对于一类以布朗运动和泊松过程为噪声源的正倒向随机微分方程,在单调性假设下,给出了解的存在性和唯一性的结果．然后将这些结果应用于带随机跳跃的线性二次非零和微分对策问题之中,由上述正倒向随机微分方程的解得到了开环Nash均衡点的显式形式．     

Jeux à champ moyen. II – Horizon fini et contrôle optimal

We continue in this Note our study of the notion of mean field games that we introduced in a previous Note. We consider here the case of Nash equilibria for stochastic control type problems in finite horizon. We present general existence and uniqueness results for the partial differential equations systems that we introduce. We also give a possible interpretation of these systems in term of optimal control. To cite this article: J.-M. Lasry, P.-L. Lions, C. R. Acad. Sci. Paris, Ser. I 343 (2006).     

Stochastic Games for N Players

The objective of this paper is to present a useful application of the theory of regularity of systems of nonlinear partial differential equations to the solution of stochastic differential games with N players. It is particularly interesting to notice that the structure of games fits perfectly with what is requested to prove the regularity property which is needed.     

一类具有无穷时滞中立型非稠定脉冲随机泛函微分方程积分解的存在性

本文讨论了一类具有无穷时滞中立型非稠定脉冲随机泛函微分方程,利用Sadovskii不动点原理等工具得到了其积分解的存在性,给出其在一类二阶无穷时滞中立型非稠定脉冲随机偏微分方程积分解的存在性中的应用.