Contextualism on a pragmatic,not a skeptical,footing

Contextualism is supposed to explain why the following argument for skepticism seems plausible: (1) I don’t know that I am not a bodiless brain-in-a-vat (BIV); (2) If I know I have hands, then I know I am not a bodiless BIV; (3) Therefore, I do not know I have hands. Keith DeRose claims that (1) and (2) are “initially plausible.” I claim that (1) is initially plausible only because of an implicit argument that stands behind it; it is not intuitively plausible. The argument DeRose offers is based on the requirement of sensitivity, that is, on the idea that if you know something then you would not believe it if it were false. I criticize the sensitivity requirement thereby undercutting its support for (1) and the skeptical data that contextualism is meant to explain. While skepticism is not a plausible ground for contextualism, I argue that certain pragmatic considerations are. It’s plausible to think that to know something more evidence is required when more is at stake. The best way to handle skepticism is to criticize the arguments for it. We should not adopt contextualism as a means of accommodating skepticism even if there are other pragmatic reasons for being a contextualist about knowledge.     

John Buridan on the Bearer of Logical Relations

According to John Buridan, the time for which a statement is true is underdetermined by the grammatical form of the sentence – the intention of the speaker is required. As a consequence, truth-bearers are not sentence types, nor sentence tokens plus facts of the context of utterance, but statements. Statements are also the bearers of logical relations, since the latter can only be established among entities having determined truth-conditions. This role of the intention of the speaker in the determination of what is said by an utterance is not isolated in medieval semantics. Thanks to Frédéric Goubier, for comments on an earlier version of this paper. I am also grateful for the support of the Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico.     

A killer theorem

Opening a copy of The Mathematical Intelligencer you may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway—a mathematical journal, or what?” Or you may ask, “Where am I?” Or even “Who am I?” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Colin Adams’s column. Relax. Breathe regularly. It’s mathematical, it’s a humor column, and it may even be harmless.     

The mathematical ethicist

Opening a copy ofThe Mathematical Intelligencer you may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway—a mathematical journal, or what?” Or you may ask, “Where am I?” Or even “Who am I?” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Colin Adams’s column. Relax. Breathe regularly. It’s mathematical, it’s a humor column, and it may even be harmless.     

Boundary Spanners as Bridges of Student and School Discourses in an Urban Science and Mathematics High School

A key to improving urban science and mathematics education is to facilitate the mutual understanding of the participants involved and then look for strategies to bridge differences. Educators need new theoretical tools to do so. In this paper the argument is made that the concept of “boundary spanner” is such a tool. Boundary spanners are individuals, objects, media, and other experiences that link an organization to its environment. They serve critical communicative roles, such as bridges for bringing distinct discourses together, cultural guides to make discourses of the “other” more explicit, and change agents for potentially reshaping participants' discourses. This ethnographic study provides three examples of boundary spanners found in the context of an urban public high school of science, mathematics, and technology: boundary media, boundary objects, and boundary experiences. The analysis brings to the foreground students' and teachers' distinct discourses about “good student identity,”“good student work,” and “good summer experience” and demonstrates how boundary spanners shaped, were shaped by, and sometimes brought together participants' distinct discourses. An argument is made for boundary spanners' practical and theoretical utility: practically, as a tool for enhancing meaning‐making between diverse groups, and theoretically, as a heuristic tool for understanding the reproductive and transformative aspects of urban science education.     

This theorem is big

Opening a copy of The Mathematical Intelligencer you may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway—a mathematical journal, or what?” Or you may ask, “Where am I?” Or even “Who am I?” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Colin Adams’s column. Relax. Breathe regularly. It’s mathematical, it’s a humor column, and it may even be harmless.     

Rumpled stiltskin

Opening a copy of The Mathematical Intelligencer you may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway—a mathematical journal, or what?” Or you may ask, “Where am I?” Or even “Who am I?” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Colin Adams’s column. Relax. Breathe regularly. It’s mathematical, it’s a humor column, and it may even be harmless.     

A subprime lending market primer

Opening a copy of TheMathematical Intelligencer you may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway—a mathematical journal, or what?” Or you may ask, “Where am I?” Or even “Who am I?” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Colin Adams’s column. Relax. Breathe regularly. It’s mathematical, it’s a humor column, and it may even be harmless.     

Mangum,P.I.

Opening a copy of The Mathematical Intelligencer you may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway —a mathematical journal, or what? ” Or you may ask, “Where am I? ” Or even “Who am I? ” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Colin Adams ’s column. Relax. Breathe regularly. It ’s mathematical, it ’s a humor column, and it may even be harmless.     

Journey to the center of mathematics

Opening a copy of The Mathematical Intelligencer you may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway—a mathematical journal, or what?” Or you may ask, “Where am I?” Or even “Who am I?” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Colin Adams’s column. Relax. Breathe regularly. It’s mathematical, it’s a humor column, and it may even be harmless.     

The Math fall fashion preview

Opening a copy of The Mathematical Intelligencer you may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway—a mathematical journal, or what?” Or you may ask, “Where am I?” Or even “Who am I?” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Colin Adams’s column. Relax. Breathe regularly. It’s mathematical, it’s a humor column, and it may even be harmless.     

Explaining modal intuition

The paper defends causal explanationism concerning our modal intuitions and judgments, and, in particular, the following claims. If a causally explainable mirroring or “pre-established harmony” between our mind and modal reality obtains, we are justified in believing it does. We do not hold our modal beliefs compulsively and blindly but with full subjective and objective justification. Therefore, causal explanation of our modal beliefs does not undermine rational trust in them. Explanation and trust support each other. In contrast, anti-explanationists (from Kant, through neo-wittgensteinians to T. Nagel and J. Pust), claim that causal explanation of intuitions and judgments undermines rational trust in them. They especially target causal explanation in terms of pre-established harmony between our mind, shaped by causal processes, and the underlying modal structure of reality. The paper argues against them. The argument builds upon the claim that the appeal to modal facts is indispensable for systematization and explanation of non-modal ones. Therefore, we should assume that modal facts exist and are not disjoint and isolated from actual facts. The modal structure of the universe intervenes in the non-modal reality. Causal processes indirectly carry information about deep modal structure. Any (reasonable candidate) causal explanation of our intuitional modal beliefs should start from this indirect contact with and information about modal facts. Therefore, if our intuitional modal beliefs are true and causally explainable (by a factual, non-modal explanans), they are true in virtue of the deep underlying modal structure. They are sensitive to modal reality and track it. We can come to know this fact, and thus strengthen our spontaneous trust in our modal intuitions.     

More from the mathematical ethicist

Opening a copy ofThe Mathematical Intelligencer you may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway—a mathematical journal, or what?” Or you may ask, “Where am I?” Or even “Who am I?” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Colin Adams’s column.Relax. Breathe regularly. It’s mathematical, it’s a humor column, and it may even be harmless.     

The three little pigs

Opening a copy ofThe Mathematical Intelligencer you may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway—a mathematical journal, or what?” Or you may ask, “Where am I?” Or even “Who am I?” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Colin Adams’s column.Relax. Breathe regularly. It’s mathematical, it’s a humor column, and it may even be harmless.     

Trial and error

Opening a copy of The Mathematical Intelligencer you may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway—a mathematical journal, or what?” Or you may ask, “Where am I?“ Or even “Who am I?” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Colin Adams’s column. Relax. Breathe regularly. It’s mathematical, it’s a humor column, and it may even be harmless.     

Williams college student course survey form: Instructor modified version

Opening a copy of The Mathematical Intelligenceryou may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway—a mathematical journal, or what?” Or you may ask, “Where am I?” Or even “Who am I?” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Colin Adams’s column. Relax. Breathe regularly. It’s mathematical, it’s a humor column, and it may even be harmless.     

The slingshot argument and the correspondence theory of truth

The correspondence theory of truth holds that each true sentence corresponds to a discrete fact. Donald Davidson and others have argued (using an argument that has come to be known as the slingshot) that this theory is mistaken, since all true sentences correspond to the same “Great Fact.” The argument is designed to show that by substituting logically equivalent sentences and coreferring terms for each other in the context of sentences of the form ‘P corresponds to the fact that P’ every true sentence can be shown to correspond to the same facts as every other true sentence. The claim is that all substitution of logically equivalent sentences and coreferring terms takes place salva veritate. I argue that the substitution of coreferring terms in this context need not preserve truth. The slingshot fails to refute the correspondence theory.     

A note on effective ultrapowers: Uniform failure of bounded collection

By suitably adapting an argument of Hirschfeld (see [2, Chapter 9]), we show that there is a single Δ₁ formula that defeats “bounded collection” for any model of II₂ Arithmetic that is either a recursive ultrapower or an existentially complete model. Some related facts are noted. MSC: 03F30, 03C62.     

Triangles, Schemes and Worlds: Reply to Nulty

Nulty proposes a “Davidsonian” argument for metaphysical pluralism, the thesis that there are (or could be) many actual worlds, which appeals to the possibility of alien forms of triangulation. I dispute Nulty’s reading of Davidson on two important points: Davidson’s attack on the notion of a conceptual scheme is not, as Nulty thinks, directed at pluralism, and his understanding of the notions of objective truth and reality is at odds with the conception needed for Nulty’s argument. I also show that the pluralist argument fails on its own terms as it requires an assimilation of worlds to worldviews. But there is much of value in Nulty’s paper despite these important flaws. When the confusions are cleared up, we are left with an intriguing and novel line of argument for conceptual relativism.