Stochastic models for bidding strategies on oligopoly electricity market

In this paper we consider the forward/futures contracts and Asian-type call options for power delivery as important components of the bidding strategies of the players’ profits on the electricity market. We show how these derivatives can affect their profit. We use linear asymmetric supply function equilibrium (SFE) and Cournot models to develop firms’ optimal bidding strategies by including forward/futures contracts and Asian-type options. We extend the methodology proposed by Niu et al. (IEEE Trans Power Syst 20(4):1859–1867, 2005), where only forward contracts for power delivery were considered in the SFE model.     

Joint pricing-servicing decision and channel strategies in the supply chain

This paper investigates the equilibrium behavior of a two-echelon supply chain in four channel strategies: (i) vertical integration, (ii) vertical Nash (iii) manufacturer’s Stackelberg and (vi) retailer’s Stackelberg. We examine the price and service level decision for each of the above four channel strategies in two cases: (i) Simultaneous service-level decision: Here, the manufacturer and retailer simultaneously choose a service level. (ii) Sequentially service-level decision: Here, the manufacturer and retailer sequentially choose a service level. We model the demand as a deterministic linear function of retailer’s price and both manufacturer’s and retailer’s service levels. We discuss the optimal configuration from each individual’s perspective for each of the above channel strategies. We show that vertical integration dominates other strategies and leads to the highest service level but lowest retail price among various channel coordination policies considered here. We yield several conclusions about the provision of service level by each supply chain individual to coordinate the channel.     

Pricing and Advertising of Private and National Brands in a Dynamic Marketing Channel

We consider a marketing channel where a retailer sells, along the manufacturer’s brand, its own store brand. We assume that each player invests in advertising in order to build the brand’s goodwill. One distinctive feature of this paper is the introduction of the negative effect of own advertising on other player’s goodwill stock evolution. We characterize feedback-Nash pricing and advertising strategies and assess the impact of the store brand and national brand’s goodwill stocks on these strategies in different settings. The main findings suggest first that investing in building up some equity for each brand reduces the price competition between them and propels the market power for both. Second, the retailer will pass to consumer an increase in its purchasing cost of the national brand in all situations as no coordination is taken into account to counter the double marginalization problem. Finally, the higher the brand equity of the store brand, the more the retailer invests in advertising.     

Channel coordination with manufacturer��s return policies within a newsvendor framework

The saliency of returns in today’s business world is unquestionable, in such items as toys, Christmas decorations, books, seasonal/fashion items and the like. This is largely due to the high economic benefits prevalent in some industries today and to the increasing opportunities for resale in secondary and global markets. This paper attempts to model the profitability of returns policy in presence of a secondary market, to a profit-maximizing manufacturer in a newsvendor framework. The returns policy applies both for the unsold merchandise left at the end of the selling season and the items returned by the unsatisfied customers within the specified time period. With a returns policy, the manufacturer shares the risks of demand uncertainty, in turn assuaged by the availability of secondary market. The manufacturer’s decision is to arrive at an optimal wholesale price and the returns policy, based on the retailer’s reaction on that offer. The retailer in turn optimizes the retail price and the order quantity to meet a price-dependent uncertain demand. This set of optimal policies has then been contrasted to that obtained from maximizing the combined profit of the manufacturer and of the retailer. The key question in the comparison has been clearly answered. The total combined profit that coordinates the policies of both channels exceeds that of the sum of the profits obtained independently.     

A Production Lot-Size Model for Perishable Items Under Two Level Trade Credit Policy for a Retailer with a Powerful Position in a Supply Chain System

This paper investigates a production lot-size inventory model for perishable items under two levels of trade credit for a retailer to reflect the supply chain management situation. We assume that the retailer maintains a powerful position and can obtain full trade credit offered by supplier yet retailer just offers the partial trade credit to customers. Under these conditions, retailer can obtain the most benefits. Then, we investigate the retailer’s inventory policy as a cost minimization problem to determine the retailer’s inventory policy. A rigorous mathematical analysis is used to prove that the annual total variable cost for the retailer is convex, that is, unique and global-optimal solution exists. Mathematical theorems are developed to efficiently determine the optimal ordering policies for the retailer. The results in this paper generalize some already published results. Finally, numerical examples are given to illustrate the theorems and obtain a lot of managerial phenomena.     

Optimal Supply Functions in Electricity Markets with Option Contracts and Non-smooth Costs

In this paper we investigate the optimal supply function for a generator who sells electricity into a wholesale electricity spot market and whose profit function is not smooth. In previous work in this area, the generator’s profit function has usually been assumed to be continuously differentiable. However in some interesting instances, this assumption is not satisfied. These include the case when a generator signs a one-way hedge contract before bidding into the spot market, as well as a situation in which a generator owns several generation units with different marginal costs. To deal with the non-smooth problem, we use the model of Anderson and Philpott, in which the generator’s objective function is formulated as a Stieltjes integral of the generator’s profit function along his supply curve. We establish the form of the optimal supply function when there are one-way contracts and also when the marginal cost is piecewise smooth.We would like to thank two anonymous referees for careful reading of the paper and helpful comments which lead to a significant improvement of this paper.     

Market power analysis in electricity markets using supply function equilibrium model

This paper presents a surveillance method based on the gametheory which is used by the ISO to find whether a power supplierin an electricity market has market power. The paper uses thesupply function equilibrium model to analyse the generationsuppliers’ bidding behaviour and models the ISO's marketpower monitoring problem as a bi-level multi-objective problem.The outer sub-problem is a multi-objective problem which maximizessuppliers’ payoffs, while the inner one is the ISO's marketclearing problem based on the locational marginal pricing mechanism.A discrete method is adopted to find ‘good enough’solutions, in a continuous bidding strategy space, which arethe intersection of all suppliers’ optimal response spacesaccording to Nash equilibrium. The paper utilizes the IEEE 118-bussystem to illustrate the application of the proposed methodwith three suppliers as price setters in the energy market andthe other generators as price takers. The numerical resultsshow that the transmission congestion may enhance the suppliers’ability to exercise market power. Likewise, suppliers’gaming behaviour could relieve the transmission congestion.It is shown that applying price caps is an efficient way ofmitigating market power.     

Advertising coordination games of a manufacturer and a retailer while introducing a new product

Two kinds of vertical cooperative advertising program are considered in a distribution channel constituted by a manufacturer and a retailer, where the manufacturer pays part of the retailer’s advertising costs. In the first participation scheme, the manufacturer chooses his/her advertising participation rate in the retailer’s advertising effort and then each player determines the advertising effort that maximizes his/her profit. In the second scheme, the retailer chooses the manufacturer’s participation rate and then the manufacturer determines the advertising efforts of both players with the objective of maximizing the manufacturer’s profit. Each participation scheme corresponds to a special Stackelberg game: the manufacturer is the leader of the first, while the retailer is the leader of the second. The Stackelberg equilibrium advertising efforts and participation rate in both games are provided. Then the equilibrium strategies of the two players in the analyzed scenarios are compared with the Nash equilibrium in the competitive framework. Finally, the conditions which suggest a special kind of agreement to a player are analyzed. This work was supported by the Italian Ministry of University and Research and the University of Padua.     

随机产出下考虑小微供应商成本利润率的供应链决策研究

小微型供应商由于产能、资金等限制,其目标可能是实现成本利润率最优,从而提高企业生存能力。基于该观察,区别于多数文献采用利润最优决策准则,本文研究由小微供应商和零售商组成的单周期供应链决策问题。小微供应商面临产出随机风险,以成本利润率最大为目标进行产能决策,零售商以利润最大为目标确定最优订购量。研究发现小微供应商的成本利润率受到自身成本偏重系数以及零售商盈利能力的共同影响,将出现亏损、合理盈利、超额盈利三种情况。并且,零售商采取不同订货策略也会对小微供应商盈利情况产生差异影响。保守(积极)订货策略下,零售商是否盈利取决于自身单位净利润能否弥补单位缺货损失(自身可盈利空间)。本文研究融合现实普遍存在的产出随机问题,为小微供应商和其他供应链成员的产能/订购决策问题提供有益的管理启示。     

Uncertain Switching Costs and Purchase Decisions in Electronic Markets

As advances in information technologies (IT) significantly reduce the time and cost of acquiring and processing product information, some buyers that traditionally work with one or few suppliers have switched to the market environment. The rapid growth of e-commerce has led researchers to believe that a uniform shift to the electronic markets is inevitable. This article examines the issue from the perspective of uncertain supplier’s performance, switching costs, and the value of information. We show that the presence of uncertainty and switching costs favors contractual relationships between buyers and suppliers. As IT makes the market more competitive, the marginal value of information diminishes. Meanwhile, the overall effect of IT on uncertainty and switching costs is fairly limited. As a result, buyers facing high uncertain supplier’s performance and switching costs may find working with a small number of suppliers a better choice.     

The optimal ordering policy with trade credit under two different payment methods

Suppliers’ offering delay payment terms to retailers can be regarded as a type of price reduction. In today’s ever competitive marketplace, offering delay payments has become a commonly adopted method to suppliers. Most of the inventory models with permissible delay in payments assumed that the entire lot size is delivered at the same time. However, in practice, goods ordered are usually arrived overtime in separate batches. In this study, we discuss an inventory problem with a finite replenishment rate under trade credit for two payment methods. We establish a theorem to find the optimal solution for each payment method. Numerical examples are also given to illustrate the solution procedure. Finally, to investigate the effect of changes of some main parameter values on the optimal solution, a sensitivity analysis is performed and some management interpretations are proposed.     

基于在线评论的多个竞争制造商和零售商的产品定价策略

在线评论作为一种产品信息传播载体,越来越受到网上电商及消费者的重视,并在很大程度上影响消费者的购买决策。本文在多个竞争性制造商为在线零售商提供可替代性产品并通过零售商销售给网络消费者的电子商务环境下,研究在线评论信息如何影响网络消费者购买决策及在线零售商和制造商的定价策略。以neo-Hoteling模型为基础,构建了依赖零售渠道在线评论的消费者选择模型,并通过模型求解定量分析了二级供应链结构分散系统下在线评论对多个竞争性制造商及零售商最优决策的影响。得到当制造商基于评论制定最优定价策略时,在线评论对市场竞争强度没有影响,但决定潜在市场大小;各产品的均衡批发价及销售价按一定的比例随评论揭示的该产品与其他产品质量均值之差(正或负)增加或减少,评论信息通常会使制造商因好评而获利,由于评论增加了不同产品需求的不对称性,零售商因而具有更大的调价空间,往往通过提高(降低)占据有利(不利)评论的产品价格获得更高的利润。     

基于收益共享契约的零售商押金补货策略研究

押金补货是指零售商在第一阶段向供应商交纳一定的押金,在接下来的阶段中不需要再交纳额外的补货费用的补货方式。对于中小型零售商,它的补货策略往往受到自有资金的约束,当自有资金不足以订到报童模型的最优补货量时,不仅自身收益受到影响,还会影响到整条供应链的收益,本文研究了在随机市场需求,且零售商能够随时向银行贷款的情况下,基于收益共享契约的零售商的押金融资订货策略。本文从两阶段出发,分析零售商的最优订货策略,研究表明,零售商的补货策略受初始资产和收益共享系数的影响。最后,文章将其扩展到多阶段问题进行讨论。     

Feedback Stackelberg equilibrium strategies when the private label competes with the national brand

We consider a noncooperative differential game where a retailer sells her own private label in addition to the manufacturer’s brand. We assume that each brand’s goodwill evolves according to a modified Nerlove-Arrow dynamics, in such a way that the advertising effort of one brand hurts the competitor’s goodwill stock. We characterize Feedback-Stackelberg pricing and advertising strategies and employ simulations to analyze their sensitivity to the main model parameters. We thank an anonymous Reviewer for very helpful comments. Research supported by NSERC, Canada, and FQRSC, Quebec. Research completed when the second author was a visiting professor at GERAD, HEC Montréal. The second author’s research was partially supported by MEC and JCYL under projects SEJ2005-03858/ECON and VA045A06, co-financed by FEDER funds.     

Selling to the “Newsvendor” with a forecast update: Analysis of a dual purchase contract

We consider a supply chain in which a manufacturer sells to a procure-to-stock retailer facing a newsvendor problem with a forecast update. Under a wholesale price contract, the retailer waits as long as she can and optimally places her order after observing the forecast update. We show that the retailer’s wait-and-decide strategy, induced by the wholesale price contract, hinders the manufacturer’s ability to (1) set the wholesale price and maximize his profit, (2) hedge against excess inventory risk, and (3) reduce his profit uncertainty. To mitigate the adverse effect of wholesale price contract, we propose the dual purchase contract, through which the manufacturer provides a discount for orders placed before the forecast update. We characterize how and when a dual purchase contract creates strict Pareto improvement over a wholesale price contract. To do so, we establish the retailer’s optimal ordering policy and the manufacturer’s optimal pricing and production policies. We show how the dual purchase contract reduces profit variability and how it can be used as a risk hedging tool for a risk averse manufacturer. Through a numerical study, we provide additional managerial insights and show, for example, that market uncertainty is a key factor that defines when the dual purchase contract provides strict Pareto improvement over the wholesale price contract.     

An integrated product returns model with logistics and marketing coordination

We develop an integrated approach for analyzing logistics and marketing decisions within the context of designing an optimal returns system for a retailer servicing two distinct market segments. At the operational level, we show that the optimal refund price is not unique. Moreover, it is such that if both market segments return a purchased product, then neither segment will receive a full money-back refund; and it is such that if one or both segments do not return a purchased product, then a refund premium over the purchase price is possible, but the refund premium will not be enough to offset a customer's total net cost of purchase and return. We also show that any improvement to the returns system that results in increased logistical efficiency or marketing effectiveness will be accompanied by an increase in the selling price of the product. At the strategic level, we show that if the retailer does not coordinate its logistics and marketing efforts to improve the overall returns system, then it will tend to over-invest in one of the functions and under-invest in the other. Finally, we illustrate how our model can be generalized to the case in which a customer's ex post valuation of the product falls along a continuum.     

Diversity of firm’s life cycle adapted from the firm’s technology investment decision

The stylized model presented is an optimal control model of technology investment decision of a single product firm. The firm’s technology investment does not have only a long-run positive effect but also a short-run adverse effect on its sales volume. We examine the case of high adverse investment effects where the firm finally leaves the market but we have observed different life cycles till this happens. Depending on the firm’s initial technology stock and sales volume, we compute different firm’s life cycles, which are driven by a trade-off between two strategies: technology versus sales focus strategy. Indifference curves, where managers are indifferent to apply initially technology or sales focus strategies, separate founding conditions of the firm to various classes distinguishable because of the firm’s life cycle.     

公平偏好下基于批发价契约的供应链 协调研究

文中基于Nash讨价还价博弈思想建立公平偏好框架,构建公平偏好效用体系,以此为基础对采用批发价契约的报童模型展开行为研究,采用数理模型和数值分析方法分析了零售商和供应商的公平偏好行为对零售商和供应链系统最优订货量的影响,即零售商和供应商同时关注公平时,零售商和供应链系统的最优订货量趋于保守;并发现零售商和供应链系统的最优订货量随零售商的公平偏好程度增加而递减,但随着供应商公平偏好程度增加而递增,且供应链系统最优订货量变化趋势比零售商明显．然后,在此基础上分析比较得到,无论供应商和零售商是否偏好公平,批发价契约都不能实现供应链协调．最后,对批发价、零售价、供应商生产成本、零售商缺货成本和供应商缺货成本进行敏感度分析．     

In–Out Algorithm for assortment planning under a ranking-based consumer choice model

We consider a retailer’s assortment planning problem under a ranking-based consumer choice model. The retailer incurs a fixed carrying cost per product offered, a substitution penalty cost for each customer who does not purchase his first choice, and a penalty cost on lost sales. We develop an effective In–Out Algorithm to identify the optimal solution. The extensive numerical study shows that the algorithm performs well, and is more than 10,000 times faster than enumeration on problems with 20 products.     

Value Estimation Approach to the Iri-Imai Method for Constrained Convex Optimization

In this paper we propose an extension of the so-called Iri-Imai method to solve constrained convex programming problems. The original Iri-Imai method is designed for linear programs and assumes that the optimal objective value of the optimization problem is known in advance. Zhang (Ref. 9) extends the method for constrained convex optimization but the optimum value is still assumed to be known in advance. In our new extension this last requirement on the optimal value is relaxed; instead only a lower bound of the optimal value is needed. Our approach uses a multiplicative barrier function for the problem with a univariate parameter that represents an estimated optimum value of the original optimization problem. An optimal solution to the original problem can be traced down by minimizing the multiplicative barrier function. Due to the convexity of this barrier function the optimal objective value as well as the optimal solution of the original problem are sought iteratively by applying Newtons method to the multiplicative barrier function. A new formulation of the multiplicative barrier function is further developed to acquire computational tractability and efficiency. Numerical results are presented to show the efficiency of the new method.His research supported by Hong Kong RGC Earmarked Grant CUHK4233/01E.Communicated by Z. Q. Luo