基于风险管理的动态供应链超网络均衡模型

基于风险管理的动态供应链超网络均衡模型的研究有助于供应链超网络节点厂商在动态环境下优化其风险管理,降低风险损失,提升供应链网络在风险管理下的竞争优势。本文以三层供应链超网络为研究对象,采用风险发生概率和损失函数表达供应链超网络中节点厂商中断风险的特征,构建了基于风险管理的动态供应链超网络均衡模型。模型中包括三种类型的节点,产品生产商、零售商和需求市场,生产商考虑风险损失的情况下,基于动态变化的风险、需求和成本追求个体期望效益最优化。接着,通过进化变分不等式来表达动态供应链超网络风险管理下的均衡解,并采用投影动态系统求解进化变分不等式,通过数值算例验证方法的可靠性和合理性,通过投影动态系统解释某一个厂商趋近均衡解的过程。通过单一厂商趋近均衡解的过程,阐述其他厂商相应的最优决策。     

二层供应链网络均衡模型的研究

利用均衡理论和二层规划理论来研究供应链网络均衡问题。针对供应链网络中上下层成员之间具有的Stackelberg博弈特征以及同层成员之间具有的非合作博弈特征,构建了二层供应链网络的均衡模型,该模型实际上一个均衡约束的二层规划问题。此外,为了使得供应链网络在整体上实现最优,本文还在模型中引入回收契约以协调供应链网络。最后,利用罚函数法对模型进行了求解,算例分析说明了模型的合理性和有效性。     

基于Stackelberg博弈的时变双层交通分配模型

提出一个时变双层交通分配模型,其中上层网络管理者设立了一个路段的最大排队长度,其目标是使由网络流和排队长度定义的总出行时间最小.目标函数在离散时段内以路段流量和排队长度作为决策变量,同时考虑不同类型的信号交叉口延误的影响.下层网络用户的反应依赖于上层管理者的决策,其选择是使自身感知阻抗最小的路径,服从一个基于成对组合Logit的路径选择模型,构成一个成对组合Logit的均衡分配问题.结合了交通分配和流传播方法,将其表示为一个均衡约束下的双层数学规划问题,形成了一个Stackelberg非合作博弈.使用遗传算法求解该双层规划问题,并采用实证分析来表现模型的特征和算法的计算表现.结果表明路径重叠、路段流量、路段排队长度等因素对网络均衡流分布均有显著影响.     

多目标供应链网络平衡模型

针对生产商、零售商和消费群三层决策者问题建立了一个多目标供应链网络均衡模型.给出此模型的均衡条件,并讨论了(弱)均衡解和标量化解之间的关系.最后,给出具体的例子说明此模型.     

基于惩罚与补贴的再制造闭环供应链网络均衡模型

为研究我国废旧电子产品(WEEE)立法的问题,分析了供应商、制造商、零售商、需求市场及回收商的行为,分别建立了变分不等式模型,并在此基础上建立了五级再制造闭环供应链网络均衡模型。模型考虑了政府对于制造商的惩罚政策与对于回收商的补贴政策。通过修正投影算法求解算例,仿真分析了旧材料转化率、回收率、惩罚及补贴政策对闭环供应链网络均衡结果的影响。结果表明,随着政府对于回收商的补贴的增加,不但回收商的回收量提高,闭环供应链的新材料需求量、旧材料需求量、销售量均增加;相反,随着政府对于制造商未完成的回收量的罚款增加,回收量、新材料需求量、旧材料需求量、销售量均降低;追求高回收率的政策并不总是有效的;而提高WEEE的旧材料转化率对于闭环供应链有利。     

考虑直销的多期供应链网络均衡模型

研究了直销供应链网络动态均衡模型,分别对制造商、零售商和需求市场的决策者的多期独立决策行为及其相互作用进行了分析,利用变分不等式构建了各层均衡模型以及系统均衡模型,得到了系统达到均衡的条件,给出了具体算例并进行了求解.构建的供应链网络动态均衡模型具有更好的适用性及普遍性,为供应链的各层成员保持供应链的稳定和长期均衡提供决策依据和决策方法.     

具有随机需求的多种差异产品供应链网络均衡模型研究

针对产品的品牌和产地存在的差异性,研究了供应链网络的均衡模型,构建了具有随机需求的多种差异产品的供应链网络均衡模型.运用随机效用理论和多项式logit模型分析了需求市场上产品的随机选择问题,利用变分不等式的形式给出了制造商、零售商,需求市场以及整个供应链网络的均衡条件,并给出了经济解释.最后,通过算例验证了模型的合理性.     

随机需求下直销多商品流供应链网络均衡模型

建立了随机需求下直销多商品流供应链网络均衡模型,导出了供应链网络达到均衡的条件,它等价于一个有限维变分不等式.通过构建修改拟牛顿法,获得了随机需求下直销多商品流供应链网络均衡模型的解(变分不等式的解),并给出了1个算例,验证了模型的正确性和算法的可行性.     

考虑零售商库存能力约束的供应链网络均衡模型研究

在考虑零售商库存能力约束情形下,研究了多个竞争的零售商与供应商组成的供应链网络均衡问题.通过对供应链各层级的供应商、零售商、消费市场最优性条件的分析,利用变分不等式构建了供应链网络均衡模型.最后,运用投影收缩算法对均衡模型进行求解,并仿真分析了零售商库存能力约束对网络成员及整个供应链网络的影响.     

由零售商负责回收的多期闭环供应链网络均衡

本文研究了零售商回收模式下多期闭环供应链网络均衡问题。制造商通过零售渠道将产品销售给消费者,以满足消费市场需求,同时消费产生的废旧品由零售商回收返回制造商处进行再制造,通过产品库存和回收废旧品连接相邻规划期。运用变分不等式理论和互补理论,分别刻画了制造市场、零售市场和消费市场的均衡,接着构建了多期闭环供应链网络均衡模型。利用变分不等式的投影收缩算法,对模型进行求解。算例着重分析了废旧品利用率对网络均衡状态和供应链成员利润的影响。结果表明:当制造商的废旧品利用率逐渐增加时,回收量逐渐增加,制造商的利润先减后增,零售商利润一直增加,而供应链总利润一直增加,供应链网络中的最优决策变量主要受到回收量约束的影响。     

The manipulability of the Shapley-value

The manipulation of the Shapley-value, when used as a resource allocation mechanism, is examined. First, the extent to which an individual can, by unilaterally misrepresenting his utility function, affect the value allocation in his favor, is evaluated. When all agents attempt to manipulate, a game results, whose equilibrium allocations can be described as follows. At an equilibrium, the initial allocation appears to be Pareto-efficient. Any equilibrium allocation is also an equilibrium allocation of the analogously defined Walrasian manipulation game. The true (constrained) Walrasian allocations are equilibrium allocations. Under two slight respecifications of the value, there are no other equilibrium allocations.This is a revised version of a University of Minnesota discussion paper (September 1979). The author thanks L. Hurwicz, T. Ikeda, T. Ito, J. Jordan, and particularly A. Mas-Colell for their comments. Assistance from NSF, under grant No 8006482, and from the Sloan Foundation, is gratefully acknowledged.     

允许卖空的资本市场中存在非负均衡价格向量的充要条件

For the capital market satisfying standard assumptions that are widely adopted in the equilibrium analysis,a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of a nonnegative equilibrium price vector that clears the mean-variance capital market with short sale allowed is derived. Moreover, the given explicit formula for the equilibrium price shows clearly the relationship between prices of assets and statistical properties of the rate of return on assets, the desired rates of return of individual investors as well as other economic quantities.The economic implication of the derived condition is briefly discussed. These results improve the available results about the equilibrium analysis of the mean-variance market.     

On the uniqueness of Bertrand equilibrium

We introduce product differentiation in the model of price competition with strictly convex costs in which firms have to supply all of the forthcoming demand. We find that although a continuum of equilibria exists in a homogeneous product market, the competitive price equilibrium is the only robust one. Specifically, as long as the equilibrium correspondence is nonempty, the equilibrium price converges to the competitive price when the degree of product differentiation shrinks to zero.     

On the Genesis of the Lagrange Multipliers

The genesis of the Lagrange multipliers is analyzed in this work. Particularly, the author shows that this mathematical approach was introduced by Lagrange in the framework of statics in order to determine the general equations of equilibrium for problems with constraints. Indeed, the multipliers allowed Lagrange to treat the questions of maxima and minima in differential calculus and in calculus of variations in the same way as problems of statics: if the equilibrium of a point or a system of points is required, there is an analogy between statics and differential calculus; if the equilibrium of a rigid body is required, there is an analogy between statics and calculus of variations.     

On the stability of a class of noncooperative games

The Nash equilibrium of a class of games generated from a market is examined. Demands are assumed linear, and production constraints are imposed. The equilibrium is shown to be solvable as a complementarity problem. If the demand matrix is a positive definite symmetric z-matrix, then the Nash equilibrium is stable. If the demand matrix is not symmetric, an additional condition yielding stability is developed.     

Program Absorption Operators in the Theory of Nonzero-Sum Differential Games

This paper is devoted the Nash equilibrium payoffs for differential games. The Nash equilibrium is one of the key concepts in the theory of noncooperative nonzero–sum two-person games. The Nash equilibrium is broadly applicable in economics as well as in biology and in, particularly, in ecology.     

Analysis of the dynamics of Cournot team-game with heterogeneous players

In this paper, we study a dynamical system of a two-team Cournot game played by a team consisting of two firms with bounded rationality and a team consisting of one firm with naive expectation. The equilibrium solutions and the conditions of their locally asymptotic stability are studied. It is demonstrated that, as some parameters in the model are varied, the stability of the equilibrium will get lost and many such complex behaviors as the period bifurcation, chaotic phenomenon, periodic windows, strange attractor and unpredictable trajectories will occur. The great influence of the model parameters on the speed of convergence to the equilibrium is also shown with numerical analysis.     

Discriminatory power and pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the lottery Blotto game

This paper highlights the role of discriminatory power in showing the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a two-player lottery Blotto game. Precisely, when the discriminatory power of the contest success function in every battle is less than or equal to one, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium always exists for any prizes and budgets. However, we construct examples in which pure strategy Nash equilibrium fails to exist as long as the discriminatory power of only one battle exceeds one.     

Mathematical analysis of a model for the transmission dynamics of bovine tuberculosis

A deterministic model for studying the transmission dynamics of bovine tuberculosis in a single cattle herd is presented and qualitatively analyzed. A notable feature of the model is that it allows for the importation of asymptomatically infected cattle (into the herd) because re‐stocking from outside sources. Rigorous analysis of the model shows that the model has a globally‐asymptotically stable disease‐free equilibrium whenever a certain epidemiological threshold, known as the reproduction number, is less than unity. In the absence of importation of asymptomatically infected cattle, the model has a unique endemic equilibrium whenever the reproduction number exceeds unity (this equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable for a special case). It is further shown that, for the case where asymptomatically infected cattle are imported into the herd, the model has a unique endemic equilibrium. This equilibrium is also shown to be globally asymptotically stable for a special case. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A regular equilibrium solves the extended HJB system

Control problems not admitting the dynamic programming principle are known as time-inconsistent. The game-theoretic approach is to interpret such problems as intrapersonal dynamic games and look for subgame perfect Nash equilibria. A fundamental result of time-inconsistent stochastic control is a verification theorem saying that solving the extended HJB system is a sufficient condition for equilibrium. We show that solving the extended HJB system is a necessary condition for equilibrium, under regularity assumptions. The controlled process is a general Itô diffusion.