| 碳减排外包下的契约优化与选择研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘振,宋寒,代应,杨尚桓. 碳减排外包下的契约优化与选择研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2022, 31(6): 25-31. DOI: 10.12005/orms.2022.0178 |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘振 宋寒 代应 杨尚桓 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆理工大学 管理学院,重庆 400054 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71801025,71802034);重庆市教育委员会人文社会科学重点项目(20SKGH160);重庆市自然科学基金项目(cstc2018jcyjAX0021) |
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| 摘 要： | 在政府碳配额、碳交易市场机制和消费者低碳偏好背景下，研究了制造商与低碳服务提供商合作下的碳减排外包问题。对技术交易型契约和合作共享型契约两种契约进行了优化，分别得到了两种契约下的最优决策和契约可达成条件，并进一步分析了制造商和低碳服务提供商对两种契约的偏好，最后利用转移支付的方式对契约偏好冲突问题进行了协调。研究结果表明，单位减排成本和碳排放权市场价格均是影响技术交易型契约和合作共享型契约可行性的关键因素；当单位最小碳排放量、单位减排成本和碳排放权市场价格同时满足一定条件时，两种契约可同时达成；制造商总是偏好技术交易型契约，但低碳服务提供商对于契约类型的偏好并不是确定的；利用转移支付协调的方式可以解决合作双方的契约偏好冲突问题，并使得双方最终达成技术交易型契约。
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| 关 键 词： | 技术交易型契约 合作共享型契约 契约选择 碳减排外包 消费者低碳偏好 |
| 收稿时间： | 2020-08-07 |
Optimization and Selection of Contracts under Carbon Emission Reduction Outsourcing |
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| LIU Zhen,SONG Han,DAI Ying,YANG Shang-huan. Optimization and Selection of Contracts under Carbon Emission Reduction Outsourcing[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2022, 31(6): 25-31. DOI: 10.12005/orms.2022.0178 |
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| Authors: | LIU Zhen SONG Han DAI Ying YANG Shang-huan |
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| Affiliation: | College of Management, Chongqing University of Technology, Chongqing 400054, China |
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| Abstract: | The paper is aimed at the issue of carbon emission reduction outsourcing in cooperation between manufacturer and low-carbon service provider under the background of government carbon quotas, carbon trading market mechanism and consumers' low-carbon preference. Technology transaction contract and cooperative sharing contract are optimized, the optimal decision and contract feasible conditions under the two contracts are obtained respectively, and the preferences of manufacturer and low-carbon service provider for the two contracts are further analyzed. Finally, we use transfer payment to coordinate the conflict of contract preferences. The research results show that both unit cost of emission reduction and unit market price of carbon emission right are the key factors that affect the feasibility of technology transaction contract and cooperative sharing contract. When unit minimum carbon emissions, unit emission reduction costs and unit market price of carbon emission right meet certain conditions at the same time, the two contracts can be simultaneously feasible. Manufacturer always prefer technology transaction contract, but low-carbon service provider's preference for contract are not certain. The use of transfer payment coordination can resolve the conflict of contract preference between the two parties and enable the two parties to reach a technical transaction contract. Finally, the rationality and effectiveness of the model is verified with examples. |
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| Keywords: | technology transaction contract cooperative sharing contract contract selection carbon emission reduction outsourcing consumer's low-carbon preference |
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