| 政府奖惩机制下零售商主导的闭环供应链微分博弈策略 |
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| 引用本文： | 王道平,张可,周玉. 政府奖惩机制下零售商主导的闭环供应链微分博弈策略[J]. 运筹与管理, 2022, 31(8): 22-30. DOI: 10.12005/orms.2022.0246 |
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| 作者姓名： | 王道平 张可 周玉 |
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| 作者单位： | 北京科技大学 经济管理学院,北京 100083 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71871017) |
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| 摘 要： | 本文在考虑政府奖惩机制下,研究零售商主导的闭环供应链中成员的动态均衡策略,其中制造商负责回收再制造,回收率随时间动态变化。分别构建了三种模式下的Stackelberg微分博弈模型:政府不对制造商和零售商实施奖惩机制、政府只对制造商实施奖惩机制以及政府同时对制造商和零售商实施奖惩机制。运用贝尔曼连续型动态规划理论,求解了三种模式下制造商和零售商的决策均衡结果并进行了对比分析,从消费者剩余价值和成员利润的视角证明了政府实施奖惩机制的有效性。最后通过算例对成员均衡策略进行了稳态分析和非稳态分析。研究结果表明:政府的奖惩机制能够正确引导闭环供应链成员做出最优决策,有利于减缓分散决策所带来的双重边际效应,提高消费者剩余价值。零售商分担回收责任会削减政府对制造商回收的激励作用,降低闭环供应链整体利润。相比之下,政府只对制造商实施奖惩机制是最优模式选择,可以同时提高经济和环保双重效益。
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| 关 键 词： | 闭环供应链 零售商主导 微分博弈 奖惩机制 |
| 收稿时间： | 2021-05-28 |
Differential Game of Retailer-Dominated Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Reward-penalty Mechanism of Government |
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| WANG Dao-ping,ZHANG Ke,ZHOU Yu. Differential Game of Retailer-Dominated Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Reward-penalty Mechanism of Government[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2022, 31(8): 22-30. DOI: 10.12005/orms.2022.0246 |
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| Authors: | WANG Dao-ping ZHANG Ke ZHOU Yu |
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| Affiliation: | School of Economics and Management, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing100083, China |
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| Abstract: | This paper studies the dynamic equilibrium strategy of the members in a retailer-dominated closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) under reward-penalty mechanism (RPM). The manufacturer collects waste products and conducts re-manufacturing and the recovery rate changes dynamically with time. We construct three Stackelberg differential game models: the government does not impose RPM on the manufacturer or the retailer, the government imposes RPM on the manufacturer separately and the government imposes RPM on both the manufacturer and the retailer. By using the Bellman's continuous dynamic planning theory, we obtain the decision equilibrium results under these three models and make a comparative analysis. We prove the effectiveness of PRM for the members of CLSC. Finally, we us numerical examples to analyze the Steady-state and unsteady-state conditions of CLSC. The results show that the RPM can correctly guide the members of CLSC to make optimal decisions, which can effectively reduce the double marginal effect of the CLSC and improve the consumer surplus. When the retailer shares the responsibility for recycling, it will reduce the government's incentive for manufacturers to recycle and reduce the overall profit of CLSC. In contrast, the RPM imposed on the manufacturer separately is the optimal pattern, which can improve the performance of economy and environmental protection. |
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| Keywords: | closed-loop supply chain retailer-dominated differential game reward-penalty mechanism |
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