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| 基于期望损失厌恶的供应链期权契约协调研究 | |
| 引用本文： | 扈衷权,冯平平,温浩宇,田军,冯耕中. 基于期望损失厌恶的供应链期权契约协调研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2022, 31(7): 71-78. DOI: 10.12005/orms.2022.0218 |
| 作者姓名： | 扈衷权 冯平平 温浩宇 田军 冯耕中 |
| 作者单位： | 1. 西安电子科技大学 经济与管理学院,陕西 西安 710126;2. 西安交通大学 管理学院,陕西 西安 710049 |
| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金青年科学基金项目(72102174,71901170);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(21XJC630004,19YJA630068);陕西省自然科学基础研究计划面上项目(2021JM-144);中央高校基本科研业务费项目(XJS200601) |
| 摘 要： | 以一个损失厌恶销售商与一个损失中性供应商组成的两级供应链为背景，利用期望损失厌恶理论对销售商在期权契约下的最优采购策略进行了研究，并证明了期望损失厌恶理论能有效克服传统基于前景理论的研究中因参考点外生且固定假设带来的弊端。在此基础上，进一步给出了供销双方在期权契约下实现协调共赢的条件，分析了销售商损失厌恶程度，期权契约价格等参数对供应链协调共赢机制的影响。结果显示：销售商的损失厌恶偏好并不会改变权利金分配整体供应链利润的作用，但会增强销售商分享收益的能力，改变供销双方利润或效用水平对权利金，产品销售价格和生产成本的敏感程度，且较高的损失厌恶偏好还会阻碍供销双方协调共赢目标的达成。 |
| 关 键 词： | 供应链管理 期望损失厌恶 期权契约 供应链协调 |
| 收稿时间： | 2020-07-08 |
Supply Chain Coordination with Option Contracts Based on Expectation-based Loss-aversion |
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| HU Zhong-quan,FENG Ping-ping,WEN Hao-yu,TIAN Jun,FENG Geng-zhong. Supply Chain Coordination with Option Contracts Based on Expectation-based Loss-aversion[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2022, 31(7): 71-78. DOI: 10.12005/orms.2022.0218 | |
| Authors: | HU Zhong-quan FENG Ping-ping WEN Hao-yu TIAN Jun FENG Geng-zhong |
| Affiliation: | 1. School of Economics and Management, Xidian University, Xi’an 710126, China;2. School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710049, China |
| Abstract: | Based on a two-level supply chain composed of a loss averse retailer and a loss neutral supplier, the optimal purchase strategy of the retailer under an option contract is studied by using the expectation-based loss-aversiontheory, which proves that the theory can effectively overcome the disadvantages caused by the exogenous and fixed assumption of the reference point in the traditional research based on the prospect theory. On this basis, the conditions for the supplierand the retailer to achieve a win-win coordination under the option contract are further given. The effects of the retailer’s loss aversion, the price of the option contract and other parameterson the win-win coordination mechanism are analyzed. The results show that the retailer’s loss aversion does not change the role of the royalty in the distribution of the overall supply chain profits, but it can enhance the retailer’s ability of sharing profits, and change the sensitivity of the profits and utility of both sides to the royalty, retail price and production cost. Moreover, the higher loss aversion preference can hinder the realization of cooperation goals between the supplier and the retailer. |
| Keywords: | supply chain management expectation-based loss-aversion option contracts supply chain coordination |
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