| 军民融合背景下地方政府支持与民企参军行为的演化博弈研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 张芳,蔡建峰,陈楠. 军民融合背景下地方政府支持与民企参军行为的演化博弈研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2022, 31(7): 1-8. DOI: 10.12005/orms.2022.0208 |
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| 作者姓名： | 张芳 蔡建峰 陈楠 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 常熟理工学院 商学院,江苏 常熟 215500;2. 西北工业大学 管理学院,陕西 西安 710129 |
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| 基金项目： | 陕西省面向 “十三五”重大理论与现实问题研究项目(N2016KA0003,2016.6-2019.12);中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(G2017KY0207,2017.1-2019.12) |
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| 摘 要： | 民参军是军民融合的重要组成内容,政府支持对于民参军的顺利进行发挥着关键作用。本文通过建立军民融合背景下的地方政府支持与民企参军行为的演化博弈模型,考察了参与者的决策演化过程,分析了参与者的进化稳定策略及影响因素。研究表明,增加地方政府对民企的资金奖励、加大民企参军税收优惠、民企资金收益率的提升,以及积极参军成本的降低,会使民企策略选择向积极参军方向演化,但却使地方政府行为向弱力度支持策略演化;而提升中央政府对地方政府的资金补助,降低地方政府支持民企积极参军的服务成本,不仅促使民企选择积极参军策略,还能促使地方政府选择强力度支持策略。最后,对模型结果进行算例分析,验证了结论的合理性。研究结果可以为当前民参军实践提供一定的理论指导。
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| 关 键 词： | 军民融合 政府支持 民参军 地方政府 演化博弈 |
| 收稿时间： | 2020-02-23 |
Research onEvolutionary Game of Local Government Support and Private Enterprises Joining the Militaryin Civil-military Integration |
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| ZHANG Fang,CAI Jian-feng,CHEN Nan. Research onEvolutionary Game of Local Government Support and Private Enterprises Joining the Militaryin Civil-military Integration[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2022, 31(7): 1-8. DOI: 10.12005/orms.2022.0208 |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Fang CAI Jian-feng CHEN Nan |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Business of School, Changshu Institute of technology, Jiangsu changshu 215500, China;2. School of Management, Northwestern Polytechnic University Shaanxi Xi’an 710129, China |
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| Abstract: | Civilian military participation is an important component of military-civilian integration, and government support plays a key role in the smooth progress of civilian military participation. The paper establishes an evolutionary game model between local government and private enterprisesin civil-military integration. Based on the evolutionary game model, the evolutionary process ofparticipants’ decision and the evolutionarily stable strategy is analyzed, and the related influencingfactors are also considered. The results show that the private enterprises joining the military can be promotedby reducing the cost of joining the military. It is harmful for local government support to strengthenthe reward andtax preferenceson privateenterprisesandincrease the earning rate of thefunds. Both the private enterprises joining the military and local government support will be promoted by enhancing the reward for local government and reducing the service cost of local government in supporting privateenterprises to join the military. Finally, the numerical simulation analysis verifies the rationality of the conclusions. The research results can provide certain theoretical guidance for the current practice of civilian participation in the army. |
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| Keywords: | civil-military integration government support civil-involved military local government evolutionary game |
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