| 基于企业环境自我规制的电器电子产品供应链决策与协调 |
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| 引用本文： | 任鸣鸣,黄佳丽,肖广来. 基于企业环境自我规制的电器电子产品供应链决策与协调[J]. 运筹与管理, 2021, 30(10): 227-232. DOI: 10.12005/orms.2021.0339 |
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| 作者姓名： | 任鸣鸣 黄佳丽 肖广来 |
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| 作者单位： | 河南师范大学 商学院,河南 新乡 453007 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社科基金项目(17BGL139);国家自然科学基金青年项目(71902055);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(20YJC630080);河南省哲学社会科学规划项目(2017BJJ038,2019CJJ074) |
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| 摘 要： | 电器电子产品制造商与零部件供应商环境自我规制是供应链获得竞争优势的重要战略,也是实现WEEE源头污染控制的关键。考虑供应商环境自我规制的溢出效应,构建四种不同环境自我规制模式下电器电子产品供应链成员的决策与协调模型,分析供应链成员决策和利润变化。发现分散决策时,制造商与供应商同时进行环境自我规制模式最优,单方企业环境自我规制模式次之,且企业环境自我规制不改变制造商在供应链上的利润优势。单方企业环境自我规制模式下,规制方的利润增量总是小于无规制方。与无环境自我规制模式相比,制造商环境自我规制模式下,供应商存在“敲竹杠”行为。最后,针对供应商和制造商同时进行环境自我规制模型,设计了制造商收益共享契约,激励制造商和供应商提高其环境自我规制水平,实现各企业利润的Pareto改进。
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| 关 键 词： | 电器电子产品 环境自我规制 溢出效应 收益共享 |
| 收稿时间： | 2019-12-11 |
Decision-making and Coordination of Electrical and Electronic Products Supply Chain Under the Environmental self-regulation of Enterprises |
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| REN Ming-ming,HUANG Jia-li,XIAO Guang-lai. Decision-making and Coordination of Electrical and Electronic Products Supply Chain Under the Environmental self-regulation of Enterprises[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2021, 30(10): 227-232. DOI: 10.12005/orms.2021.0339 |
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| Authors: | REN Ming-ming HUANG Jia-li XIAO Guang-lai |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Business School, Henan Normal University, Xinxiang 453007, China;2. Business School, Henan University, Kaifeng 475001, China |
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| Abstract: | Under the spillover effect of supplier environmental self-regulation, the decision-making and coordination model of supply chain members of electrical and electronic products was constructed. And the decision-making and profit of supply chain members under four modes was compared and analyzed. The results show that: in decentralized decision-making model, the type of the bilateral enterprises environmental self-regulation is optimal for the supplier, the manufacturer, and the chain system. In addition, the unilateral enterprise environmental self-regulation is the second. And the environmental self-regulation of enterprises does not change the profit advantage of manufacturers in the supply chain. Under the unilateral regulation mode, the profit increment of the regulator is always smaller than that of the non-regulator. Compared with the non-regulation mode, the supplier has the behavior of hold-up in the manufacturer regulation mode. Finally, the revenue sharing contract was designed to stimulate manufacturers and suppliers to participate in environmental self-regulation, which could achieve Pareto improvement of enterprise profits. |
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| Keywords: | electrical and electronic product environment self-regulation spillover effect revenue sharing |
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