| 期末二次订购下风险规避且促销的收益共享契约协调研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘彩云,杨志林. 期末二次订购下风险规避且促销的收益共享契约协调研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2019, 28(8): 134-140. DOI: 10.12005/orms.2019.0184 |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘彩云 杨志林 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.铜陵学院 数学与计算机学院,安徽 铜陵 244061; 2.合肥工业大学 数学学院,安徽 合肥 230009 |
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| 基金项目： | 安徽省高校优秀拔尖人才培育项目(gxgnfx2019042,gxyq2019218);安徽省高校自然科学重点项目((KJ2019A0701,KJ2018A0748);安徽省自然科学基金面上项目(1608085MA03) |
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| 摘 要： | 在期末二次订购下,利用CVaR准则考察收益共享下销售商风险规避且促销的决策问题,并得到一些有意义的管理启示。讨论了风险中性制造商在两生产模式下的生产决策。探讨了收益共享措施的协调问题,分析了各参数的关系,获得如下启示:销售商越是风险规避,首次订购量越少;制造商的首次生产量不一定是首次订购量,在有二次订货情况下可以投机生产来获得额外利润;在收益共享措施下,批发价固定,要风险态度不同的销售商订购等量的商品,风险规避度大的销售商,分享收益的比例小;如果制造商想要收益共享比例增大,那么首次批发价就要降低。
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| 关 键 词： | 收益共享契约 二次订购 风险规避 促销努力 CVAR |
| 收稿时间： | 2019-01-17 |
Research on Revenue Sharing Contract Coordination for a Risk-averse andPromotional of Retailer under Second Order at the End of the Period |
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| LIU Cai-yun,YANG Zhi-lin. Research on Revenue Sharing Contract Coordination for a Risk-averse andPromotional of Retailer under Second Order at the End of the Period[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2019, 28(8): 134-140. DOI: 10.12005/orms.2019.0184 |
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| Authors: | LIU Cai-yun YANG Zhi-lin |
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| Affiliation: | 1.Department of Mathematics, Tong Ling University, Tong Ling 244061, China; 2.School of Mathematics, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230009, China |
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| Abstract: | Under the second order at the end of sales season, the decision-making for a risk-averse and promotional retailer under revenue sharing contract is studied by using CVaR risk measurement criterion, and some managerial insights are developed. The production decision of risk neutral manufacturer under two production modes is discussed. It explores the coordination of revenue sharing contract, analyses the relationship between parameters, and draws the following management enlightenment: The more risk-averse the retailer is, the less the first order quantity is; the manufacturer’s first production quantity is not necessarily the first order quantity, and speculative production can be made to gain additional profits in the case of second order. under the revenue-sharing contract, when the wholesale price is fixed and the retailers with different risk attitudes order the equal amount of commodities, the more risk-averse the retailers are, the less the proportion of revenue-sharing is. If the manufacturer wants to increase the share of revenue, the first wholesale price will be reduced. |
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| Keywords: | revenue sharing contract second order risk aversion promotional effort CVaR |
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