| 基于演化博弈的制造企业低碳技术采纳决策机制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 徐建中,徐莹莹. 基于演化博弈的制造企业低碳技术采纳决策机制研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2014, 23(5): 264-272 |
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| 作者姓名： | 徐建中 徐莹莹 |
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| 作者单位： | 哈尔滨工程大学 经济管理学院,黑龙江 哈尔滨 150001 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71273072);黑龙江省自然科学基金资助项目(G201119) |
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| 摘 要： | 为实现CO2减排目标,针对我国企业应对气候变化整体表现较差的问题,利用演化博弈理论和方法构建了企业低碳技术采纳决策模型,并对策略选择进行稳定性分析。理论研究和数值仿真结果表明:市场机制下只有当采纳低碳技术能够获得额外净收益时企业群体才会向全部选择采纳的“理想状态”演化,反之,企业选择不采纳策略,此时政府实施低碳技术投入和碳减排两种补贴政策可诱导系统向“理想状态”演化,但应将补贴系数控制在一定范围内发挥其最大激励效用。
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| 关 键 词： | 管理科学 低碳技术采纳决策 演化博弈 制造企业 |
| 收稿时间： | 2013-05-05 |
Study on Low-carbon Technology Adoption among Manufacturers Based on Evolutionary Game Theory |
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| XU Jian-zhong,XU Ying-ying. Study on Low-carbon Technology Adoption among Manufacturers Based on Evolutionary Game Theory[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2014, 23(5): 264-272 |
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| Authors: | XU Jian-zhong XU Ying-ying |
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| Affiliation: | School of Economics and Management, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin 150001, China |
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| Abstract: | In order to achieve CO2 emission reduction targets and solve Chinese enterprises' poor performance on response to climate change, decision-making model of low-carbon technology adoption is built based on evolutionary game theory, and stable strategies are analyzed. Theoretical study and numerical simulation show that enterprise groups will evolve to an “ideal state” of all adoption only when they can obtain excess returns by low-carbon technology adoption. Otherwise, enterprises do not choose low-carbon technology adoption. In this case, subsidy policies such as investment of low-carbon technology and carbon reduction should be implemented to guide evolution into the “ideal state”, but the subsidies should be controlled in certain ranges to maximize their incentive effect. |
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| Keywords: | management science low-carbon technology adoption decisions evolutionary game theory manufacturers |
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