| 基于系统动力学的邻避设施PPP项目三方演化博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 程敏,刘亚群,王洪强. 基于系统动力学的邻避设施PPP项目三方演化博弈分析[J]. 运筹与管理, 2019, 28(10): 40-49. DOI: 10.12005/orms.2019.0222 |
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| 作者姓名： | 程敏 刘亚群 王洪强 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海大学 管理学院,上海 200444摘 要:为了解邻避设施PPP项目中公共部门、私人部门和公众的行为选择及其影响因素,将演化博弈方法与系统动力学方法相结合开展研究。首先,在三方具有有限理性的前提下,构建三方演化博弈模型,对三方主体的互动行为及稳定状态进行分析;然后,在此基础上采用系统动力学方法对三方演化博弈过程进行动态模拟仿真,研究各种不确定性因素对博弈演化过程的影响,为制定相关政策提供依据;最后,根据仿真结果提出对策建议。仿真结果表明,三方主体的策略选择由多个外部变量因素共同作用,通过改变仿真系统中的外部变量取值,系统最终能达到政府积极监管、企业积极努力、公众参与监督的均衡状态;在三方博弈过程中,政府起引导作用,公众的监督作用不容忽视,合理的惩罚方案有助于减少企业机会主义行为。因此,可从构建多主体协调机制、重视公众参与监督、构建社会监督保障体系、设计合理的激励方案等方面促进邻避设施PPP项目顺利开展。关键词:邻避设施;PPP项目;演化博弈;系统动力学中图分类号:F294 文章标识码:A 文章编号:1007-3221201910-0040 |
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| 基金项目： | 上海市哲学社会科学规划项目(2016BGL008) |
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| 摘 要： | 为了解邻避设施PPP项目中公共部门、私人部门和公众的行为选择及其影响因素,将演化博弈方法与系统动力学方法相结合开展研究。首先,在三方具有有限理性的前提下,构建三方演化博弈模型,对三方主体的互动行为及稳定状态进行分析;然后,在此基础上采用系统动力学方法对三方演化博弈过程进行动态模拟仿真,研究各种不确定性因素对博弈演化过程的影响,为制定相关政策提供依据;最后,根据仿真结果提出对策建议。仿真结果表明,三方主体的策略选择由多个外部变量因素共同作用,通过改变仿真系统中的外部变量取值,系统最终能达到(政府积极监管、企业积极努力、公众参与监督)的均衡状态;在三方博弈过程中,政府起引导作用,公众的监督作用不容忽视,合理的惩罚方案有助于减少企业机会主义行为。因此,可从构建多主体协调机制、重视公众参与监督、构建社会监督保障体系、设计合理的激励方案等方面促进邻避设施PPP项目顺利开展。
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| 关 键 词： | 邻避设施 PPP项目 演化博弈 系统动力学 |
| 收稿时间： | 2018-06-08 |
An Evolutionary Game Analysis on the PPP projects of NIMBY Facility Based on System Dynamics |
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| CHENG Min,LIU Ya-qun,WANG Hong-qiang. An Evolutionary Game Analysis on the PPP projects of NIMBY Facility Based on System Dynamics[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2019, 28(10): 40-49. DOI: 10.12005/orms.2019.0222 |
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| Authors: | CHENG Min LIU Ya-qun WANG Hong-qiang |
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| Affiliation: | School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200444, China |
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| Abstract: | In order to understand the factors that influence the behavior options of the government, the enterprise, and the public in PPP projects of not-in-my-backyard(NIMBY)facility, the evolutionary game method and the system dynamics method are combined to carry out the study. Firstly, an evolutionary game model is constructed based on the assumption that the three parties have bounded rationality, and the interaction mechanism and the stability of the three parties are analyzed. Then, the system dynamics method is used to simulate the three-party evolution game process, and the influence of various uncertain factors on the game evolution process is studied, which provides a basis for formulating relevant policies. Finally, countermeasures are proposed based on the simulation results. The simulation results show that the strategic choice of the three parties is influenced jointly by some external variables. When changing the value of the external variables in the simulation system, the game will eventually reach the equilibrium state in which the government supervises positively, the enterprise makes positive efforts and the public participates in supervision. It is also shown that the government is the dominant player in the process of tripartite game and the public supervision is important in PPP projects of NIMBY facility. Meanwhile, a reasonable project punishment scheme is helpful for reducing the opportunistic behavior of the enterprise. Therefore, it is possible to promote the smooth progress of the PPP project of the NIMBY facility from the aspects of constructing a multi-agent coordination mechanism, attaching importance to public supervision, constructing a social supervision system, and designing a reasonable incentive plan. |
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| Keywords: | NIMBY facility PPP projects evolutionary game system dynamics |
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