| 新能源分时租赁汽车监管机制的演化博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 万晓榆,陈业建. 新能源分时租赁汽车监管机制的演化博弈分析[J]. 运筹与管理, 2020, 29(2): 79-98. DOI: 10.12005/orms.2020.0037 |
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| 作者姓名： | 万晓榆 陈业建 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆邮电大学 经济管理学院,重庆 400065 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金资助项目(15XGL024);重庆市人文社会科学重点研究项目(K2018-22)。 |
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| 摘 要： | 目前我国新能源分时租赁汽车正处于发展初期,其发展过程中存在的问题接踵而至,如运营不力、安全隐患以及骗取补贴金等,对消费者和政府造成了较大的困扰。本文运用演化博弈理论构建了政府部门、企业与消费者之间的三方动态博弈模型,基于复制动态方程和雅可比矩阵对模型进行求解分析,并通过Python软件对模型结果进行数值仿真模拟。研究表明,当关键参数取值位于不同数值区间时,系统分别呈现出四种演化稳定结果。适当加大补贴额度与惩罚力度、增加消费者得到的补偿系数比例、敦促企业降低努力经营成本,有利于新能源分时租赁汽车行业的健康发展。研究结论为政府部门政策制定及决策实施提供理论依据与参考。
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| 关 键 词： | 新能源 分时租赁 演化博弈 监管 |
| 收稿时间： | 2018-09-04 |
Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Supervision Mechanism of New Energy Time-sharing Rental Vehicles |
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| WAN Xiao-yu,CHEN Ye-jian. Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Supervision Mechanism of New Energy Time-sharing Rental Vehicles[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2020, 29(2): 79-98. DOI: 10.12005/orms.2020.0037 |
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| Authors: | WAN Xiao-yu CHEN Ye-jian |
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| Affiliation: | School of Economics and Management, Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Chongqing 400065, China |
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| Abstract: | Presently,new energy time-sharing rental vehicles are in an early stage of development in China,and problems like ineffective operation,security issues and subsidies cheating arise one after another,which have caused great trouble to consumers and the government.In this paper,a three-way dynamic game model among government,enterprises and consumers is constructed and solved based on the evolutionary game theory.The model results are numerically simulated by Python software.Theresearch shows that there are four evolutionary stability results when the key parameters are set in different numerical ranges.Therefore,appropriately increas-ing the amount of subsidy and punishment,increasing the proportion of compensation coefficient received by consumers,and urging enterprises to reduce operating costs are conducive to the healthy development of the new energy vehicle rental market.The conclusions of the research can work as a theoretical basis and reference for government sectors to make and implement a policy. |
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| Keywords: | new energy time-sharing evolutionary game supervision |
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