| 虚拟第三方下供应链激励协调 |
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| 引用本文： | 黄梅萍,汪贤裕,耿子扬. 虚拟第三方下供应链激励协调[J]. 运筹与管理, 2013, 22(3): 214-221 |
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| 作者姓名： | 黄梅萍 汪贤裕 耿子扬 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.福州大学 土木工程学院,福建 福州 350108;2.四川大学 工商管理学院,四川 成都 610064;3.成都中医药大学 管理学院,四川 成都 610075 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071103);福州大学科研启动项目(0460-022509);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(3YJC63005) |
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| 摘 要： | 为了解决供应商隐藏成本信息、销售商隐藏努力行动所引起的逆向选择和道德风险问题,文章基于委托代理理论,引入虚拟第三方为协调主体,分别站在供应商和销售商的角度,通过设计合适的契约激励销售商努力工作和供应商“说真话”。研究结果表明,当供应链中只有道德风险存在时,可以通过如(16)式的契约(其中契约参数λ∈[0,1])实现供应链的完美协调;但是,当供应链中不仅仅存在道德风险还存在逆向选择时,该契约参数不再是区间[0,1]上任意的值,而是与供应链交易量q及供应商的生产成本c相关的定值(满足(29)式),此时的供应链才能实现协调;在该契约下,为获得更多的利益,供应商更有动机降低自身生产成本,销售商也更有积极性提高努力水平,从而实现“双赢”。最后,通过数值算例对模型进行了应用分析。
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| 关 键 词： | 供应链 双边不对称信息 激励协调 虚拟第三方 委托代理 |
| 收稿时间： | 2011-09-28 |
Incentives and Coordination in Supply Chain Based on Virtual-third Party |
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| HUANG Mei-ping,WANG Xian-yu,GENG Zi-yang. Incentives and Coordination in Supply Chain Based on Virtual-third Party[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2013, 22(3): 214-221 |
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| Authors: | HUANG Mei-ping WANG Xian-yu GENG Zi-yang |
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| Affiliation: | 1. College of Civil Engineering, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350108, China;2. Business School, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610064,China;3. School of Management, Chengdu University of Traditional Chinese Medicine, Chengdu 610075,China |
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| Abstract: | To solve the adverse selection and moral hazard when the supplier hides its information about production cost, and the retailer hides its action about sales effort, a virtual-third party is introduced as a coordination body to implement double incentives on the basis of principal agent theory. And respectively from the perspective of supplier and retailer, a contract is designed to incent the supplier to tell the truth and the retailer to work hard. The results show that if there is only moral hazard, the perfect coordination of the supply chain could be realized by the contract as expression(16). However, if there is not only moral hazard but also adverse selection, the coordination of the supply chain could be achieved only when the contract parameter has a constant value. And this value is related to the trading volumeq and the supplier's production costc(as expression(29)). Moreover, the supplier is encouraged to cut its production cost and the retailer is incented to improve the effort level, so the “win-win” result is reached. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate application of this model. |
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| Keywords: | supply chain bilateral asymmetric information incentives and coordination virtual-third party principal agent |
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