Prisoner's Dilemma Game with Heterogeneous Influential Effect on Regular Small-World Networks |
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引用本文: | 吴枝喜,许新建,汪映海.Prisoner's Dilemma Game with Heterogeneous Influential Effect on Regular Small-World Networks[J].中国物理快报,2006,23(3):531-534. |
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作者姓名: | 吴枝喜 许新建 汪映海 |
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作者单位: | Institute of Theoretical Physics, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou 730000 |
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摘 要: | The effect of heterogeneous influence of different individuals on the maintenance of co-operative behaviour is studied in an evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game with players located on the sites of regular small-world networks. The players interacting with their neighbours can either co-operate or defect and update their states by choosing one of the neighbours and adopting its strategy with a probability depending on the pay off difference. The selection of the neighbour obeys a preferential rule: the more influential a neighbour, the larger the probability it is picked. It is found that this simple preferential selection rule can promote continuously the co-operation of the whole population with the strengthening of the disorder of the underlying network.
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关 键 词: | 异质影响 概率 博弈论 相关性函数 数字模拟 |
收稿时间: | 2005-09-21 |
修稿时间: | 2005-09-21 |
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