| 不确定偏好序下的双边匹配博弈 |
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| 引用本文： | 林杨,王应明.不确定偏好序下的双边匹配博弈[J].运筹学学报,2010,24(1):155-162. |
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| 作者姓名： | 林杨 王应明 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 福建师范大学经济学院, 福州 350107;2. 福州大学决策科学研究所, 福州 350107 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金（No.19BGL092） |
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| 摘 要： | 针对带有不确定偏好序的双边匹配问题，现有方法大都仅注重整体收益之和，忽略了参与人的个体收益以及在交互选择中的策略运用.基于最大满意度准则，给出不确定序下的收益（满意度）矩阵的推导过程；然后，从个体理性视角，结合矩阵博弈的思想构建一种兼顾整体和个体收益的博弈匹配优化模型，并证明模型最优解满足纳什均衡.最后，进一步探讨各种策略选择及其优劣分析.
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| 关 键 词： | 双边匹配 不确定偏好序 收益矩阵 博弈匹配 纳什均衡 |
| 收稿时间： | 2017-12-25 |
Two-sided game matching with uncertain preference ordinal |
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| LIN Yang,WANG Yingming.Two-sided game matching with uncertain preference ordinal[J].OR Transactions,2010,24(1):155-162. |
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| Authors: | LIN Yang WANG Yingming |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Economics, Fujian Normal University, Fuzhou 350107, China;2. Decision Science Institute, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350107, China |
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| Abstract: | Owing to the problem of two-sided matching decision with uncertain preference ordinal (UPO), the existing methods mainly consider the overall payoff only. Yet the individual payoff and strategic operations during matching are often neglected in mutual choices. Based on the criteria of maximum satisfaction, a process for handling UPO is developed to derive payoff matrix. Then, a game-based matching model is built from the viewpoint of individual rational. This model takes account of both overall and individual payoff, which is combined with the idea of matrix game. Moreover, the results are proved to be Nash equilibrium. Finally, discussions on different strategic choices, as well as their advantages and limits analysis are presented. |
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| Keywords: | two-sided matching uncertain preference ordinal payoff matrix game matching Nash equilibrium |
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