非对称信息下供应商-零售商供应链的批量折扣决策

在供应链管理的文献中,许多工作研究供应商如何使用激励手段,如数量折扣,去影响零售商的订货行为以增加供应商的利润(与整个供应链的利润).多种形式的激励策略模型已有许多,但通常有一个关键的假设,即,供应商关于零售商的成本结构具有完全信息.本文研究了在非对称信息下供应商的最优数量折扣决策问题,得到了最优策略,并与完全信息的情形进行了比较.

Discounting Decisions in a Supplier-buyer Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information

In the supply-chain literature, an increasing body of work studies how the suppliers can use incentive schemes such as quantity discounts to influence buyers' ordering behaviors, thus increasing the supplier's (and the total supply chain's) profits. Various functional forms for such incentives have been proposed, but a critical assumption always made is that the supplier has full information about the buyer's cost structure. In this paper, the optimal quantity discount policy under asymmetric information is derived and compares it to the situation where the supplier has full information.