多期完全信息博弈中的自我控制现象：一个基于双重自我模型的分析框架

现有文献对双重自我的研究仅限于对单人决策问题的探讨. 基于Fudenberg 和 Levine (American Economic Review, 2006, 96(5): 1449-1476) in 2006 的理论框架，建立将单人决策拓展至多人博弈的双重自我模型，以更准确地刻画和研究人们在现实生活中的互动行为. 利用该模型对某一完全信息下的两期多重均衡博弈展开分析，并与其他无双重自我个体的经济学模型进行对比. 双重自我模型在与Fudenberg-Levine 模型的公理假设保持一致的基础上，提出了更具一般性的体现多人互动特征的自我控制成本概念.

Multi-period complete-information games with self-control: a dual-self approach

The existing literature on dual-self has focused on individual decision-making problems. We adopt the theoretical framework established by Fudenberg and Levine (American Economic Review, 2006, 96(5): 1449-1476) in 2006 to propose a new dual-self model that expands individual decision problems to multi-player strategic situations, better reflecting human interactions in reality. For the example of two-period complete-information game with multiple equilibria provided in this paper, we analyze it using our proposed dual-self model and compare the results we found with those of economic models without dual-self. Consistent with the Fudenberg-Levine axioms, our model defines a more general concept of self-control cost that takes into account multi-player interactions.