The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games |
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Authors: | M Maschler G Owen |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Mathematics, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel 2. Department of Mathematics, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, USA
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Abstract: | A new value is defined for n-person hyperplane games, i.e., non-sidepayment cooperative games, such that for each coalition, the Pareto optimal set is linear. This is a generalization of the Shapley value for side-payment games. It is shown that this value is consistent in the sense that the payoff in a given game is related to payoffs in reduced games (obtained by excluding some players) in such a way that corrections demanded by coalitions of a fixed size are cancelled out. Moreover, this is the only consistent value which satisfies Pareto optimality (for the grand coalition), symmetry and covariancy with respect to utility changes of scales. It can be reached by players who start from an arbitrary Pareto optimal payoff vector and make successive adjustments. |
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