|
|||||
|
|
Ranking asymmetric auctions |
|
| Authors: | Arieh Gavious Yizhaq Minchuk |
| Institution: | 1. Faculty of Business Administration, Ono Academic College, Kiryat Ono, Israel 2. Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, Ben-Gurion University, Beersheba, Israel 3. Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, Sami Shamoon College of Engineering, Beersheba, Israel |
| Abstract: | We compare the expected revenue in first- and second-price auctions with asymmetric bidders. We consider “close to uniform” distributions with identical supports and show that in the case of identical supports the expected revenue in second-price auctions may exceed that in first-price auctions. We also show that asymmetry over lower valuations has a stronger negative impact on the expected revenue in first-price auctions than in second-price auctions. However, asymmetry over high valuations always increases the revenue in first-price auctions. |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录！ | |