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A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power
Authors:Mehmet Bac
Institution:(1) Bilkent University, Department of Economics, Bilkent, Ankara, 06533 Turkey (e-mail: bac@bilkent.edu.tr), TR
Abstract:Strategic delay and restricted offers are two modes of signaling bargaining power in alternating offers bargaining games. This paper shows that when both modes are available, the best signaling strategy of the “strong” type of the informed player consists of a pure strategic delay followed by an offer on the whole pie. There is no signaling motivation for issue-by-issue bargaining when the issues are perfectly substitutable. Received: July 1996/Final version: August 1999
Keywords:: Alternating offers bargaining  incomplete information  sequential equilibrium  delay
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