Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule |
| |
| Authors: | Matthias Messner Mattias K Polborn |
| |
| Institution: | (1) IGIER, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy;(2) Department of Economics, University of Illinois, 1206 S Sixth Street, Champaign, IL 61820, USA |
| |
| Abstract: | We analyze the effects of voter coordination on the equilibrium of voting games. Specifically, we analyze the concepts of
strong equilibrium and coalition-proof equilibrium for plurality rule and runoff rule elections. We characterize these equilibria
in the three candidate case, and provide results for important special cases in the general multicandidate case.
|
| |
| Keywords: | Strategic voting Runoff rule Plurality rule Coalition-proofness Communication |
| 本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录！ |
|
