| 中小企业融资中的逆向选择和道德风险 |
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| 引用本文： | 陈晖,单国莉.中小企业融资中的逆向选择和道德风险[J].大学数学,2006,22(3):60-66. |
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| 作者姓名： | 陈晖 单国莉 |
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| 作者单位： | 烟台职业学院,软件工程学院,烟台,264001 |
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| 摘 要： | 针对我国中小企业融资难的难题,利用博弈论和信息经济学的有关理论知识,从定量的角度深入分析了中小企业融资中逆向选择和道德风险的形成过程和机理,从理论上论证了中小企业融资难的重要原因在于中小企业与金融机构之间信息分布的非对称,在此基础上并给出了降低或规避逆向选择和道德风险的途径.
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| 关 键 词： | 逆向选择 道德风险 中小企业 博弈模型 |
| 文章编号： | 1672-1454（2006）03-0060-07 |
| 收稿时间： | 2004-12-27 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年12月27 |
Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard on Finance of Small and Medium Enterprises |
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| CHEN Hui,SHAN Guo-li.Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard on Finance of Small and Medium Enterprises[J].College Mathematics,2006,22(3):60-66. |
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| Authors: | CHEN Hui SHAN Guo-li |
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| Abstract: | The financial problem of small and medium enterprises is a main problem in our economy.According to game theory and information economy,the paper gives a detailed analysis about adverse selection and moral hazard.The reason of financial problem is theoretically caused by asymmetric information between small and medium enterprises and finance agency.Finally,the paper gives some feasible methods to reduce or prevent,adverse selection and moral hazard. |
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| Keywords: | adverse selection moral hazard small and medium enterprise game model |
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