| 银行保险中的委托-代理人激励模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 张剑,陆余楚.银行保险中的委托-代理人激励模型[J].应用数学与计算数学学报,2002,16(2):37-44. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张剑 陆余楚 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海大学数学系,上海,200436 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文运用信息经济学里的委托－代理人理论，研究了银行保险中银行对其代理保险的员工激励问题， 建立了将主观绩效评价和客观绩效评价相结合的激励模型，其中主观绩效评价因涉及多因素多层次的模糊评价因素，采用二级模糊综合评判的方法。并将此模型运用于上海地区的银行保险激励的实际问题。
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| 关 键 词： | 银行保险 委托－代理人激励模型 信息经济学 激励相容约束 二级模糊综合评判 最优化问题 |
| 修稿时间： | 2002年7月10日 |
Principal-Agent Model In Bancassurance Business |
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| JIAN ZHANG YUCHU LU.Principal-Agent Model In Bancassurance Business[J].Communication on Applied Mathematics and Computation,2002,16(2):37-44. |
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| Authors: | JIAN ZHANG YUCHU LU |
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| Abstract: | In this paper, principal-agent theory in information economics is applied to study how banks establish the incentive system for their employees in the bancassurance business. An incentive model based on both objective performance evaluation and subjective performance evaluation is established. Because it involves fuzzy evaluation factors with the character of multi-factor and multi-grade, 2-grade fuzzy comprehensive evaluation is adopted in subjective performance evaluation. In the end, we use this model in the practical problem of bancassurance business in shanghai. |
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| Keywords: | Bancassurance Incentive Principal-agent model Fuzzy comprehensive evaluation |
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