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Existence of minmax points in discontinuous strategic games
Authors:Vincenzo Scalzo
Institution:Dipartimento di Matematica e Statistica, Università di Napoli Federico II, via Cinthia (Monte S. Angelo), 80126 Napoli, Italy
Abstract:In this note we prove the existence of minmax points for strategic form games where the sets of strategies are topological spaces and the payoff functions satisfy conditions weaker than continuity. The employed tools are the class of transfer weakly upper continuous functions and the class of weakly lower pseudocontinuous functions. An example shows that our result is of minimal character.
Keywords:Minmax points  Discontinuous non-cooperative games  Repeated games
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