双边投资协定与外商直接投资——基于信号模型的博弈分析

在Jan Peter Sasse(2011)分析的基础上,进一步放宽其假设条件,利用不完全信息下的信号传递模型,对双边投资协定(Bilateral Investment Treaty,BIT)的信号效应机制进行分析.研究发现:BIT作为东道国传递给投资者的信号,该信号有效的条件在于BIT遵守成本的差异,投资者因此有了区分不同类型东道国的依据.东道国之间的引资竞争关系,会不断升级BIT的版本与内容,直至投资环境较差东道国的遵守成本高至无法覆盖签订BIT所带来的投资收益,此时高标准BIT的二次信号有效.此外,在模型拓展分析的基础之上,试图解释了“为何当前高标准BIT已成为各国所关注的对象?以及投资环境越自由的东道国所签订的BIT标准为何越高?”等问题,这对于理解BIT影响外商直接投资的信号机制提供了新的视角与思路.

Bilateral Investment Treaty and Foreign Direct Investment:Game Analysis Based on the Signal Model

This paper,on the basis of Jan Peter Sasse′s(2011)analysis,further relaxed its hypothetical conditions,and used the incomplete information game model to analyze the signal effect mechanism of Bilateral Investment Treaties(BITs).It has been found that the effective conditions of the signal,BITs as the signal transmitted to investors by host countries,lie in the difference of the compliance cost of BITs,which is the basis for investors to distinguish between different types of host countries.The competition between host countries in attracting investment will continuously upgrade the version and content of BITs until the compliance cost of host countries with poor investment environment is high enough to fail to cover investment gains brought by the signing of BITs.In this case,the secondary signal of high-standard BITs is effective.This paper,on the basis of extension analysis of the model above,attempts to explain why the current high standard BITs have become the objectives of concern of countries?And why the standards of BITs signed by the host countries with more liberal investment environment are higher?This paper provides a new perspective to understand the BIT signal mechanism affecting foreign direct investment.