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寡头垄断市场三度价格歧视动态博弈分析
引用本文:高兴佑.寡头垄断市场三度价格歧视动态博弈分析[J].经济数学,2013(3):6-11.
作者姓名:高兴佑
作者单位:(曲靖师范学院 经济与管理学院,云南 曲靖655011)
摘    要:对两寡头厂商2元市场用完全信息动态博弈的方法分析了实施三度价格歧视情形和统一定价情形的均衡产量,均衡价格和均衡总收益,并研究了这两种情形三个指标之间的关系.结果显示,在两个子市场的需求函数为线性需求的条件下,统一定价的市场均衡产量等于歧视定价的市场均衡产量;统一定价的均衡价格是歧视定价时两个子市场均衡价格的加权平均;统一定价的市场均衡总收益小于歧视定价的市场均衡总收益.

关 键 词:寡头垄断市场  三度价格歧视  完全信息动态博弈  斯塔克博格模型

Analysis on Third Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly Market Based on Dynamic Game Theory
GAO Xing you.Analysis on Third Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly Market Based on Dynamic Game Theory[J].Mathematics in Economics,2013(3):6-11.
Authors:GAO Xing you
Abstract:Equilibrium output, equilibrium price and equilibrium total revenue in the case of implementing third-degree price discrimination and unified pricing were analyzed under the condition of two oligopoly enterprises with 2 sub markets by complete information dynamic game method, and the relationship between the three indexes of the two cases were studied. The results showed that, under the condition of linear demand functions of the two sub markets, the equilibrium output of unified pricing was equal to the equilibrium output of discriminative pricing; the equilibrium price of unified pricing was the weighted average of the equilibrium prices of two sub markets with discriminative pricing; the equilibrium total revenue of unified pricing was less than the equilibrium total revenue of discriminative pricing.
Keywords:oligopoly market  third degree price discrimination  complete information dynamic game  Stackelberg model
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