隐性投资的博弈分析

为了形成双方的有效交易 ,交易的一方往往需要进行隐性投资。文章从三个方面来讨论这个问题 :首先 ,讨论了在一般情况下隐性投资不足的问题 ;然后 ,又从扩大外部机会的角度阐述了如何解决隐性投资的不足 ;最后 ,利用委托—代理关系理论 ,通过一个具体的模型讨论了隐性投资的激励问题。从而得出 ,隐性投资的买方最优投资是不可能实现的 ,买方可以通过一定方式来提高隐性投资

GAME ANALYSIS OF LATENT INVESTMENT

For the validity of trade between the two exchange parties,the one parrty often need make latent investment. The text expatiate the problem from three aspects. FirstIly, to set forth the lack of latent irivestment in general condition;successively,the text expatiate how to resolve the problem of latent investment from the view of spreading the exterior opportunity;Finally,to utilize princinal agency and make use of a visualized example discuss the incentive problem of latent investmerent. We can educe it is impossible to get that the optimum of the society or purchaser;and only can get inferior optimum by a incentive way that improve the latent investment.