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竞争环境下多个损失规避零售商的供应链回购契约
引用本文:胡支军,王永利,向淑文.竞争环境下多个损失规避零售商的供应链回购契约[J].经济数学,2010,27(2):28-35.
作者姓名:胡支军  王永利  向淑文
作者单位:贵州大学,理学院,贵州,贵阳,550025
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目,贵州大学引进人才科研资助项目 
摘    要:研究由单个风险中性的供应商与多个竞争的损失厌恶零售商组成的两阶段供应链,在回购契约中考察竞争和零售商的损失厌恶态度对其最优订购决策和整个供应链协调性的影响.应用博弈论的方法,证明了该供应链博弈存在唯一的纯策略Nash均衡,而且竞争使得零售商的总订购量上升,而损失规避使得总订购量下降.竞争的存在削弱了损失厌恶效应对整个供应链协调性的影响.研究还发现,零售商的最优订购量随供应商的批发价增大而增大,随回购价格的增大而减少,并且在一定条件下回购契约可以使得供应链达到协调.

关 键 词:供应链  竞争  回购契约  损失规避  Nash均衡

Study on Buyback Contract with Competition between Multiple Loss averse Retailers
HU Zhi jun,WANG Yong li and XIANG Shu wen.Study on Buyback Contract with Competition between Multiple Loss averse Retailers[J].Mathematics in Economics,2010,27(2):28-35.
Authors:HU Zhi jun  WANG Yong li and XIANG Shu wen
Institution:(College of Science,Guizhou University,Guiyang,Guizhou 550025,China)
Abstract:This paper considered a two-stage supply chain composed of a risk-neutral supplier and multiple competing retailers,and investigated the combined impact of competetion and retailer's loss aversion attitiude on the decision-making behavior of retailer and the coordination of supply chain with buyback contract.Based on game theory,it shows that in this supply chain game,there exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium,and the whole system's optimal order quantity increases as the degree of competition increases but decreases as the loss aversion increases.Meanwhile,the competition weakens the effect of loss aversion on coordination of the whole supply chain.It also shows that the loss-aversion retailer's optimal order quantity decreases as the increase of the wholesale price and the decrease of the buyback credit.Moreover,the supply chain can achieve coordination with a buyback contract.
Keywords:supply chain  competition  buyback contract  loss aversion  Nash equilibrium
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