| 重复博弈下借款人违约风险研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 高东杰.重复博弈下借款人违约风险研究[J].经济数学,2020,37(3):51-54. |
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| 作者姓名： | 高东杰 |
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| 作者单位： | 郑州轻工业大学经济与管理学院 ,河南郑州 450001 |
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| 摘 要： | 通过建立投资人和平台多方均面临借款人违约风险的不完全信息博弈模型，寻找单次博弈的均衡点，再将博弈重复无限次得出了新的均衡.
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| 关 键 词： | 数理经济学 违约风险 博弈论 庞氏骗局 均衡分析 |
Research on Default Risk of Borrower Based on Repeated Game |
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| GAO Dongjie.Research on Default Risk of Borrower Based on Repeated Game[J].Mathematics in Economics,2020,37(3):51-54. |
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| Authors: | GAO Dongjie |
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| Abstract: | A static game model of incomplete information between investor and platform who both face the default risk of borrower in the P2P lending relationship is established, and the new equilibrium is obtained on the basis of service fee profits by repeating this game model infinitely. |
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| Keywords: | mathematical economics default risk game theory Ponzi scheme equilibrium analysis |
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