| 风险投资分段投资的单合同最优激励模型研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 张新立,霍彪.风险投资分段投资的单合同最优激励模型研究[J].经济数学,2008,25(2). |
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| 作者姓名： | 张新立 霍彪 |
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| 作者单位： | 辽宁师范大学数学学院,辽宁大连,116021 |
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| 摘 要： | 针对风险投资分段投资存在的道德风险问题,运用委托代理理论,建立了单合同的风险投资家和风险企业家之间的最优激励模型,模型对单合同的最优激励报酬进行了优化,并给出了风险投资的最优合同安排和最优退出时机,使风险投资家和风险企业家博弈达到均衡状态.最后,给出了一个简单算例.
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| 关 键 词： | 风险投资 分段投资 单合同 最优激励 |
A SINGLE CONTRACT OPTIMIZATION OF MULTI-PERIOD VENTURE CAPITAL AND ITS OPTIMAL EXIT |
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| Zhang Xinli,Huo Biao.A SINGLE CONTRACT OPTIMIZATION OF MULTI-PERIOD VENTURE CAPITAL AND ITS OPTIMAL EXIT[J].Mathematics in Economics,2008,25(2). |
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| Authors: | Zhang Xinli Huo Biao |
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| Institution: | Zhang Xinli,Huo Biao (School of Mathematics,Liaoning Normal University,Dalian,116021,China) |
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| Abstract: | By applying to principal-agent theory,a single contract incentive reward model is set up between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur under the moral hazard.The single contract incentive reward is optimized,the model gives the optimal contract and exit time to make the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur find the equibrium.Finally,the model is illustrated by an example. |
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| Keywords: | Venture capital staged financing single contract optimal incentive |
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