| 激励机制对于经营者和股东的协调作用 |
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| 引用本文： | 朱祎莉,柴俊.激励机制对于经营者和股东的协调作用[J].经济数学,2003,20(2):41-45. |
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| 作者姓名： | 朱祎莉 柴俊 |
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| 作者单位： | 华东师范大学数学系,上海,200062 |
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| 摘 要： | 摘要由于股东分散使得股东和经营者之间获得信息不对称 ,由此产生了股东和经营者之间的矛盾 .本文提出可以通过赠股或奖金期权的形式建立模型进行协调并用库恩 -塔克定理进行简化 .
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| 关 键 词： | 激励模型 有约束条件的非线性规划 库恩-塔克定理 奖金期权 |
| 修稿时间： | 2002年11月15 |
INCENTIVE ON THE COORDINATION BETWEEN ENTREPRENEUR AND STOCKHOLDER |
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| Zhu Yi,li,Chai Jun.INCENTIVE ON THE COORDINATION BETWEEN ENTREPRENEUR AND STOCKHOLDER[J].Mathematics in Economics,2003,20(2):41-45. |
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| Authors: | Zhu Yi li Chai Jun |
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| Abstract: | The disperse of stockholders makes non symmetry of information between the entrepreneur and stockholders.So there is a contradiction between them. The paper establishes the incentive model to coordinate the contradiction by presenting stocks or bonus options to entrepreneur and simplifies it by Kuhn Tucker theory. |
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| Keywords: | Incentive model nonlinear optimization on restraint condition Kuhn Tucker theory bonus option |
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