“讨价还价”的“纳什解”的形成路径与结论拓展

建立了一个"讨价还价"的双边适应性预期模型,并利用这个模型的二元常系数线性差分方程组,揭示"纳什讨价还价解"的形成路径.对于不是"纳什讨价还价解"的一般讨价还价的成交结果,同样可以运用这样一个模型来揭示.基于这个模型,当买、卖双方希望成交,各方的出价通过逐次调整会最终收敛到同一个常数,因此能够从理论上保证讨价还价最终成交.双方当中有一方不肯让价而成交的情形,可以作为这个模型退化成为单边适应性预期模型的情形.举例计算说明了一个讨价还价问题的收敛过程与结果.

The Formation Path of “Nash Solution” of Bargain and the Development of Its Conclusion

A bilateral adaptive expectation model of “bargain” was set up ,a binary constant coefficients liner difference equation system of the model was used ,and a formation path of “Nash Bargaining Solution”was explicated .This model can al‐so be used to explicate a common conclusion of bargain that is not “Nash Bargaining Solution .” Based on this model ,bids of both buyer and seller all converge to same constant if they wish to clinch a deal ,so that the“bargain”can clinch a deal ensured in theoretical meaning .A situation can be as the degeneration of the model that both clinch a deal although one of them keeps own bid from beginning to end ,because it becomes a single adaptive expectation model .An example was drawn upon to verify the process and result of a common bargain problem .