| 上市公司多个大股东并存时的监督与共谋行为博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 倪青山,杨晓萍.上市公司多个大股东并存时的监督与共谋行为博弈分析[J].经济数学,2007,24(1):107-110. |
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| 作者姓名： | 倪青山 杨晓萍 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 湖南大学统计学院,湖南长沙,410079
2. 湖南大学会计学院,湖南长沙,410079 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文通过构建多个大股东并存时的监督与共谋博弈模型,分析发现如果国有股减持后形成国有股、法人股和机构投资者等多个大股东并存的股权结构,在多个大股东并存且达到了混合策略均衡时,有利于上市公司价值的提高,并在一定程度上可以抑制大股东的侵害行为。
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| 关 键 词： | 大股东 博弈分析 混合策略均衡 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006年6月21日 |
SUPERVISION OR COMPLICITY: WHEN SEVERAL MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS OF LISTED COMPANIES COEXISTENCE |
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| Ni Qingshan,Yang Xiaoping.SUPERVISION OR COMPLICITY: WHEN SEVERAL MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS OF LISTED COMPANIES COEXISTENCE[J].Mathematics in Economics,2007,24(1):107-110. |
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| Authors: | Ni Qingshan Yang Xiaoping |
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| Abstract: | By constructing game model of several major shareholders which are formation after the reduction of State-owned shares,we round that Ownership Structure of several major shareholders coexistence can raise the value of listed companies and inhibit expropriation behavior of the major shareholders when they reached mixed strategy equilibrium. |
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| Keywords: | major shareholders game analysis mixed strategy equilibrium |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
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