| 约束商品经营者做虚假广告的两种博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 丁利荣,崔玉泉.约束商品经营者做虚假广告的两种博弈分析[J].经济数学,2003,20(3):54-59. |
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| 作者姓名： | 丁利荣 崔玉泉 |
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| 作者单位： | 山东大学数学与系统科学学院,山东济南,250100 |
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| 摘 要： | 广告是消费者了解商品的种类、价格和性能的重要信息途径 ,也是商品经营者重要的营销手段 .但是 ,目前社会上存在着商品经营者做虚假广告以追求超额利润的现象 .本文从政府监督部门与商品经营者之间、消费者与商品经营者之间的关系出发 ,对约束经营者做虚假广告作出博弈分析 ,并进一步讨论了消费者和经营者的多阶段 (无限次重复 )博弈等情况
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| 关 键 词： | 完全信息博弈 多阶段博弈 无限次重复博弈 纳什均衡 |
| 修稿时间： | 2002年10月29 |
TWO GAME THEORY ANALYSES ABOUT RESTRAINING UNREAL ADVERTISEMENT |
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| Ding Lirong,Cui Yuquan.TWO GAME THEORY ANALYSES ABOUT RESTRAINING UNREAL ADVERTISEMENT[J].Mathematics in Economics,2003,20(3):54-59. |
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| Authors: | Ding Lirong Cui Yuquan |
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| Abstract: | Advertisement provides consumers important information of commodity, and also provides managers the way of sale. But, nowadays in society, there is phenomenon which the managers do unreal advertisement to pursue superprofit. This paper gives two game theory analyses about restraining unreal advertisement by two relations being in market, that is the one between govemment supervisor and manager, another between consumer and manager. Furthermore, this paper also discusses multiple stages game(unlimited repeated game) between consumer and manager. |
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| Keywords: | Complete information game multiple stages game unlimited repeated game Nash's equilibrium |
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