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风险投资合约中最优努力与收益分享比的关系
引用本文:莫 悠,常佳佳.风险投资合约中最优努力与收益分享比的关系[J].经济数学,2018(1):31-38.
作者姓名:莫 悠  常佳佳
作者单位:贵州大学管理学院;贵州财经大学数学与统计学院;
摘    要:构建了多阶段风险投资的委托代理模型,同时考虑了投资家和企业家两方面的努力,对企业家和投资家的最优努力水平与收益分享系数的关系进行了理论分析和数值模拟,随后考虑了企业家公平偏好对努力水平的影响.发现随着互补程度的增大,两者努力水平对分享系数的反应曲线趋于重合.公平偏好的加入使得投资家和企业家对自身收益更加敏感.

关 键 词:风险投资  委托代理  努力互补  公平偏好

The Relationship Between Optimal Effort and Benefit-Sharing Ratio in Venture Capital Contracts
MO You,CHANG Jiaji.The Relationship Between Optimal Effort and Benefit-Sharing Ratio in Venture Capital Contracts[J].Mathematics in Economics,2018(1):31-38.
Authors:MO You  CHANG Jiaji
Abstract:We built a multi-stage venture capital''s principal-agent model that considered both the investor and entrepreneur''s efforts .We did a theoretical analysis and numerical simulation of the relationship between the benefit-sharing ratio and the best efforts of entrepreneurs and investors, and then we considered the impact of entrepreneurs'' fairness preferences. It is found that with the increase of complementarity, the response curve of the two efforts to the sharing coefficient tends to coincide with each other. The inclusion of fairness preferences makes investors and entrepreneurs more sensitive to their own earnings.
Keywords:risk investment  principal-agent  efforts completely  fair preference
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