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三方相互威慑讨价还价模型
引用本文:龚智强,谢政,戴丽.三方相互威慑讨价还价模型[J].经济数学,2015(2):87-92.
作者姓名:龚智强  谢政  戴丽
作者单位:国防科学技术大学 理学院数学与系统科学系,湖南 长沙,410073
基金项目:国防科技大学科研计划项目
摘    要:研究了三方相互威慑讨价还价问题,从合作博弈的角度建立了三方相互威慑讨价还价模型.并且通过对均衡存在性和冲突可能性的分析,给出了三方相互威慑问题冲突发生的条件以及存在均衡状态时的均衡解.最后通过实验验证了本文分析的正确性.

关 键 词:博弈论  折损因子  讨价还价  相互威慑  Nash均衡

A Bargaining Model of Mutual Deterrence Between Three Players
GONG Zhi-qiang,XIE Zheng,DAI Li.A Bargaining Model of Mutual Deterrence Between Three Players[J].Mathematics in Economics,2015(2):87-92.
Authors:GONG Zhi-qiang  XIE Zheng  DAI Li
Institution:GONG Zhi-qiang;XIE Zheng;DAI Li;College of Science,National University of Defense Technology;
Abstract:In this paper we study the problem of mutual deterrence and build a bargaining model of mutual deterrence between three players through cooperation game and the bargaining model built by Rubinstein. And through the analysis of the credibility of deterrence and the probability of conflict, the conditions which cause the occurrence of the conflict between the players and the equilibrium of the problem if it exists have been given in the paper. Finally, the validity of the analysis is verified by experiment.
Keywords:game theory  discount factor  bargaining  mutual deterrence  Nash equilibrium
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