委托代理冲突下的企业投融资决策

采用实物期权与均衡定价理论,研究委托-代理冲突下的企业投融资决策问题.考虑管理者拥有企业投融资决策权时,其如何同时选择投资时机、投资规模及资本结构.分析了管理者持股与项目风险(不确定性)对企业非效率投融资的影响.数值分析表明:给定资本结构下,杠杆企业管理者决策的投资时机与投资规模变化呈现出负相关;对比于纯股权融资企业,杠杆企业管理者加速了投资期权的执行并增大了投资规模;财务杠杆率是管理者持股比例的U形函数,且管理者持股比例的增大,会加速投资期权的执行、增大投资规模与债务融资规模,并降低代理成本;项目风险的增大会导致企业投资时机、投资规模、债务融资规模和代理成本增大及财务杠杆率降低.

Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions underPrincipal-Agent Conflict

This paper studied corporate investment and financing decisions under principal-agent conflict by means of real options approach and equilibrium pricing theory. We considered the investment timing, investment capacity and capital structure choice simultaneously when corporate investment and financing decisions were made by a self-interested manager. We analyzed how the manager''s ownership stake and project risk affected inefficient investment and financing decisions. The numerical results show that the investment timing and investment capacity of leveraged firm are negatively related to each other under the given capital structure; The manager will accelerate the investment and increase the investment capacity, compared with an unlevered firm; Leverage ratio exhibits a U-shaped pattern against the manager''s ownership stake; A greater manager''s ownership stake makes investment earlier and results in an increase in investment capacity and debt financing capacity, and a decrease in agency costs of debt; An increase in project risk delays investment and leads to an increase in investment capacity and debt financing capacity, a sharp increase in agency costs of debt, and a decrease in leverage ratio.