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客运问题的进化博弈分析
引用本文:余孝军.客运问题的进化博弈分析[J].经济数学,2011,28(1):1-4.
作者姓名:余孝军
作者单位:贵州财经学院,数学与统计学院,贵州,贵阳,550004;贵州省经济系统仿真重点实验室,贵州,贵阳,550004
基金项目:贵州省科学技术基金项目
摘    要:构建了客运车主群体之间以及客运车主群体与客运管理部门之间的博弈模型及其复制动态方程,并对复制动态方程做了分析与讨论,得出了博弈模型中各博弈方的进化稳定策略,并根据所提出的博弈模型,提出了合理性建议.

关 键 词:客运问题  进化博弈  复制动态方程  进化稳定策略

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Passenger Transport
YU Xiao jun.Evolutionary Game Analysis on Passenger Transport[J].Mathematics in Economics,2011,28(1):1-4.
Authors:YU Xiao jun
Institution:YU Xiao-jun1,2(1.School of Mathematics and Statistics,Guizhou College of Finance and Economics,Guiyang,Guizhou 550004,China;2.Guizhou Key Laboratory of Economic System Simulation,Guiyang,Guizhou 550004,China)
Abstract:The passenger transport is very important in modern life. This paper presented a game model among the bus owner of passenger transport and a game between the bus owner of passenger transport and passenger transport management department. The duplicative dynamic equations of these games were formulated and solved for stable solutions. Various evolutionary stable strategies were analyzed and some reasonable advices based on the evolutionary game models were proposed.
Keywords:passenger transport  evolutionary game  duplicative dynamic equation  evolutionary stable strategy
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