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区域品牌过度使用与投入不足的风险防范及规避
引用本文:刘敬伟,蒲勇健.区域品牌过度使用与投入不足的风险防范及规避[J].经济数学,2020(4):96-101.
作者姓名:刘敬伟  蒲勇健
作者单位:(1.茅台学院 工商管理系,贵州 仁怀 564500; 2.重庆大学 经济与工商管理学院,重庆 400040)
摘    要:区域品牌作为一种公共物品,同其他公共物品一样具有非竞争性和非排他性的性质,现有理论和研究表明,这种性质决定了区域品牌具有“公共地悲剧”风险,这种风险表现为过度使用.但通过构建博弈模型,对比模型的纳什均衡解和帕累托最优解,可以发现区域品牌化过程中的“公共地悲剧”风险不仅表现为过度使用,也表现为投入不足,即具有双重性.并通过对这种双重性的内在机理进行分析,提出有效防范和规避“公共地悲剧”风险的政策建议.

关 键 词:区域品牌  公共地悲剧  纳什均衡  帕累托最优

Risk Prevention and Avoidance of Excessive Use and Insufficient Investment of Regional Brands
LIU Jingwei,PU Yongjian.Risk Prevention and Avoidance of Excessive Use and Insufficient Investment of Regional Brands[J].Mathematics in Economics,2020(4):96-101.
Authors:LIU Jingwei  PU Yongjian
Abstract:As a kind of public goods, regional brand has the same non-competitive and non-exclusive nature as other public goods. The existing theory and research show that this nature determines that regional brand has the risk of "tragedy of the Commons", which is manifested as overuse. However, by constructing game model and comparing the Nash equilibrium solution and Pareto optimal solution of the model, we can find that the risk of "tragedy of the Commons" in the process of regional branding is not only excessive use, but also insufficient investment, that is, it has duality. And through the analysis of the internal mechanism of this duality, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions to effectively prevent and avoid the risk of "tragedy of the Commons".
Keywords:regional brands  tragedy of the commons  nash equilibrium  pareto optimality
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