首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      


INACCESSIBLE CONTINUOUSLY STABLE STRATEGIES
Authors:J APALOO
Abstract:ABSTRACT. The evolutionary stability concepts continuously stable strategies (CSS) and evolutionarily stable neighborhood invader strategies (ESNIS) share two properties in common. First, they are both evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS). Secondly, given any strategy in the close neighborhood of the CSS or ESNIS, there are some strategies that are closer to the CSS or ESNIS that can invade it. An ESNIS is a CSS but the converse is not true in general. We examine evolutionary adaptive dynamics in the neighborhood of a CSS that is not an ESNIS. We show that if an evolutionary game possesses a CSS which is not an ESNIS, the succession of strategies mediated by natural selection become arbitrarily close to the CSS but the precise value of the CSS cannot be attained unless the CSS is the first strategy to invade into the environment and is henceforth never perturbed. Thus if evolution does not start with the CSS that is not an ESNIS, we will have a phenomenon of bounded evolutionary succession that does not come to an end. The analysis is applied to a class of monomorphic population evolutionary game models in which species ecological interaction is modeled by the Lotka‐Volterra equations.
Keywords:Evolutionarily stable strategy  neighborhood invader strategy  evolutionarily stable neighborhood invader strategy  stability  natural selection  convergence stability  continuously stable strategy  protected dimorphisms
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号