CREATION OF MARINE RESERVES AND INCENTIVES FOR BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION

Abstract Despite a number of benefits, marine reserves provide neither incentives for fishermen to protect biodiversity nor compensation for financial loss due to the designation of the reserves. To obtain fishermen's support for marine reserves, some politicians have suggested that managers of new marine reserves should consider subsidizing or compensating those fishermen affected by the new operations. The objective of this paper is to apply principal–agent theory, which is still infrequently applied to fisheries, to define the optimal reserve area, fishing effort, and transfer payments in the context of symmetric and asymmetric information between managers and fishermen. The expected optimal reserve size under asymmetric information is smaller than that under symmetric information. Fishing efforts encouraged with a transfer payment are always less compared to those without payment. This reflects the fact that as the manager induces the fishermen to participate in the conservation program, the fishermen will take into account their effects on fish stock by decreasing their effort. Examples are also supplied to demonstrate these concepts.