The agency problem between the owner and the manager in real investment: The bonus-audit relationship |
| |
| Authors: | Michi Nishihara Takashi Shibata |
| |
| Institution: | a Center for the Study of Finance and Insurance, Osaka University, Osaka 560-8531, Japan
b Graduate School of Social Sciences, Tokyo Metropolitan University, Tokyo 192-0397, Japan |
| |
| Abstract: | This paper derives the owner’s optimal contract with a bonus-incentive and audit when the owner delegates the investment timing decision to a manager with private information on an investment project. The optimal solution not only unifies the previous studies, but also accounts for actual auditing systems in firms. |
| |
| Keywords: | Real options Asymmetric information Agency conflicts Audit |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
