|
|||||
|
|
Subgame-consistent cooperative solutions in randomly furcating stochastic differential games |
|
| Authors: | LA Petrosyan DWK Yeung |
| Institution: | aFaculty of Applied Mathematics-Control Processes, St. Petersburg State University, 198904, Petrodivorets, St. Petersburg, Russia;bCenter of Game Theory, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Kowloon, Hong Kong;cSt. Petersburg State University, 198904, Petrodivorets, St. Petersburg, Russia |
| Abstract: | The paradigm of randomly-furcating stochastic differential games incorporates additional stochastic elements via randomly branching payoffs in stochastic differential games. This paper considers dynamically stable cooperative solutions in randomly furcating stochastic differential games. Analytically tractable payoff distribution procedures contingent upon specific random realizations of the state and payoff structure are derived. This new approach widens the application of cooperative differential game theory to problems where the evolution of the state and future environments are not known with certainty. Important cases abound in regional economic cooperation, corporate joint ventures and environmental control. An illustration in cooperative resource extraction is presented. |
| Keywords: | Cooperative solution Randomly furcating differential games Dynamic stability Subgame consistency |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ | |