考虑招标人收益的工程招投标博弈分析

传统的投标博弈来源于拍卖模型,只有投标人参与,没有招标人参与,而实际上,现代评标方法的多样性决定了招标人在招投标博弈中的重要性,文章在对招投标博弈与拍卖博弈进行比较分析后,构建了包括招投标多方、招标人对收益具有风险偏好且类型未知的非完全信息静态博弈,比以往的单纯用投标人的成本作为整个模型的参数更加具有合理性.最后给出博弈的均衡解以及数值计算,同时为招投标双方的决策给出理论分析与现实意义.

Improvement of Bidding Game:Take Return of Tenderee into Consideration

Traditional bidding game derived from the classical auction theory with only bidders and no tenderees participating.In fact,the diversity of method to evaluate bidding documents determines the importance of tenderee in bidding model.After compares the bidding game of project and auction game,the paper builds a static game of incomplete information with tenderee and take risk preference of tenderee into consideration.The Bayes Nash equilibrium is made and its theoretical analysis is proposed.